Re: [nfsv4] I-D Action: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-01.txt

Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu> Tue, 23 April 2019 13:42 UTC

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From: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:42:13 -0400
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To: "Mkrtchyan, Tigran" <tigran.mkrtchyan@desy.de>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>, NFSv4 <nfsv4@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [nfsv4] I-D Action: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-01.txt
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On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 4:44 AM Mkrtchyan, Tigran
<tigran.mkrtchyan@desy.de> wrote:
>
>
>
> The other aspect that probably makes sense to describe is the behavior
> when server insist on TLS, some thing like that only operation NULL
> is accepted and anything else fails with error AUTH_TOOWEAK or similar.
> In general, the point is not to enforce one or an other way, but clearly
> specify the client/server interaction to avoid ambiguity for implementors.
> IOW, pure egoism :)

Isn't this already taken care of by the NFS layer. Say my server is
exporting only krb5 flavors and my client mounts with sec=sys, I will
get a ERR_WRONGSEC back and mount would fail.

>
> Tigran.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Benjamin Kaduk" <kaduk@mit.edu>
> > To: "Chuck Lever" <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
> > Cc: "NFSv4" <nfsv4@ietf.org>
> > Sent: Monday, April 22, 2019 5:48:15 PM
> > Subject: Re: [nfsv4] I-D Action: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-01.txt
>
> > On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 01:11:54PM -0400, Chuck Lever wrote:
> >>
> >> > On Apr 16, 2019, at 1:09 PM, David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > I'm confused by the addition of the word "opportunistically" in the abstract.
> >> > This document defines an important way of providing security to RPC-based
> >> > protocols such as NFSv4, so as to deal with the very real security problemms
> >> > that these protocols have.    While these facilities can only be used when both
> >> > client and the server provides support, I don't think that fact alone make the
> >> > use of these facilties "opportunistic".    What exactlty is this word intended
> >> > to imply?
> >>
> >> "Opportunistic" is a term of art. See:
> >>
> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS
> >
> > RFC 7435 is also a good reference for this topic (and one that has IETF
> > consensus, FWIW).
> >
> > The summary of the reasoning for the use of this term is basically that it
> > does not provide protection in the face of an *active* attacker (that can
> > force downgrade to the previous/insecure technology), but does protect
> > against passive observation.
> >
> > -Ben
> >
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