Re: [nfsv4] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-15: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

I'm sorry, but I still find this really opaque.

What I'm looking for is a simple statement. Either "The security properties
of the protocol described in this document are equivalent to those of NFS
vX"
or "The security properties of the protocol described in this document are
equivalent to those of NFS vX if you do X, Y, and Z" or
"The security properties of the protocol described in this document are
different from those of NFS vX in the following ways"

-Ekr



On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 1:43 PM, Tom Haynes <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Hi Eric,
>
> I haven’t seen a reply to this one.
>
> The current draft-18 has the changes mentioned in this thread.
>
> It has:
>
>
>    The pNFS feature partitions the NFSv4.1+ file system protocol into
>    two parts, the control path and the data path (storage protocol).
>    The control path contains all the new operations described by this
>    feature; all existing NFSv4 security mechanisms and features apply to
>    the control path (see Sections 1.7.1 and 2.2.1 of [RFC5661]).  The
>    combination of components in a pNFS system is required to preserve
>    the security properties of NFSv4.1+ with respect to an entity
>    accessing data via a client, including security countermeasures to
>    defend against threats that NFSv4.1+ provides defenses for in
>    environments where these threats are considered significant.
>
>    The metadata server is primarily responsible for securing the data
>    path.  It has to authenticate the client access and provide
>    appropriate credentials to the client to access data files on the
>    storage device.  Finally, it is responsible for revoking access for a
>    client to the storage device.
>
> Would having something like:
>
>    The pNFS feature partitions the NFSv4.1+ file system protocol into
>    two parts, the control path and the data path (storage protocol).
>    The control path contains all the new operations described by this
>    feature; all existing NFSv4 security mechanisms and features apply to
>    the control path (see Sections 1.7.1 and 2.2.1 of [RFC5661]).  The
>    combination of components in a pNFS system is required to preserve
>    the security properties of NFSv4.1+ with respect to an entity
>    accessing data via a client, including security countermeasures to
>    defend against threats that NFSv4.1+ provides defenses for in
>    environments where these threats are considered significant.
>
>    The data path is also constrained to security mechanisms of the
>    NFS version being used between the client and the storage
>    device. The metadata server authenticates the client access and provides
>    appropriate credentials to the client to access data files on the
>    storage device.  Finally, it is responsible for revoking access for a
>    client to the storage device.
>
> be better for you?
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
> On Apr 11, 2018, at 2:25 PM, Tom Haynes <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Hi Eric,
>
> It is the same.
>
> Section 2.2:
>
>    It is RECOMMENDED to implement common access control methods at the
>    storage device filesystem to allow only the metadata server root
>    (super user) access to the storage device, and to set the owner of
>    all directories holding data files to the root user.  This approach
>    provides a practical model to enforce access control and fence off
>    cooperative clients, but it can not protect against malicious
>    clients; hence it provides a level of security equivalent to
>    AUTH_SYS.  It is RECOMMENDED that the communication between the
>    metadata server and storage device be secure from eavesdroppers and
>    man-in-the-middle protocol tampering.  The security measure could be
>    due to physical security (e.g., the servers are co-located in a
>    physically secure area), from encrypted communications, or some other
>    technique.
>
> (By the way, this contradicts the original text in my first paragraph below
> and is why we needed a change.)
>
> And as for why, Section 15.1.1 discusses why RPCSEC_GSS is not
> provided in this version of the Flex File Layout Type.
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
> On Apr 11, 2018, at 1:52 PM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Hi Tom.
>
> This text is clear, but I fear it doesn't answer the question I asked in
> my discuss: how does the security here compare to ordinary NFS and why.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 11:08 AM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> Hi, Tom,
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 12:38 PM, Tom Haynes <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> So actually, after thinking about, the discussion about securing the
>>> namespace on
>>> the storage device is wrong.
>>>
>>> The current text is:
>>>
>>>
>>>    The combination of file handle, synthetic uid, and gid in the layout
>>>    are the way that the metadata server enforces access control to the
>>>    data server.  The directory namespace on the storage device SHOULD
>>>    only be accessible to the metadata server and not the clients.  In
>>>    that case, the client only has access to file handles of file objects
>>>    and not directory objects.  Thus, given a file handle in a layout, it
>>>    is not possible to guess the parent directory file handle.  Further,
>>>    as the data file permissions only allow the given synthetic uid read/
>>>    write permission and the given synthetic gid read permission, knowing
>>>    the synthetic ids of one file does not necessarily allow access to
>>>    any other data file on the storage device.
>>>
>>>    The metadata server can also deny access at any time by fencing the
>>>    data file, which means changing the synthetic ids.  In turn, that
>>>    forces the client to return its current layout and get a new layout
>>>    if it wants to continue IO to the data file.
>>>
>>>    If the configuration of the storage device is such that clients can
>>>    access the directory namespace, then the access control degrades to
>>>    that of a typical NFS server with exports with a security flavor of
>>>    AUTH_SYS.  Any client which is allowed access can forge credentials
>>>    to access any data file.  The caveat is that the rogue client might
>>>    have no knowledge of the data file's type or position in the metadata
>>>    directory namespace.
>>>
>>> My replacement would be:
>>>
>>>    The combination of file handle, synthetic uid, and gid in the layout
>>>    are the way that the metadata server enforces access control to the
>>>    data server.  The client only has access to file handles of file
>>>    objects and not directory objects.  Thus, given a file handle in a
>>>    layout, it is not possible to guess the parent directory file handle.
>>>    Further, as the data file permissions only allow the given synthetic
>>>    uid read/write permission and the given synthetic gid read
>>>    permission, knowing the synthetic ids of one file does not
>>>    necessarily allow access to any other data file on the storage
>>>    device.
>>>
>>>    The metadata server can also deny access at any time by fencing the
>>>    data file, which means changing the synthetic ids.  In turn, that
>>>    forces the client to return its current layout and get a new layout
>>>    if it wants to continue IO to the data file.
>>>
>>
>> Thanks for proposing new text here.
>>
>> Spencer (S) as shepherd and WG co-chair, does this look like something
>> that would come as a surprise to the working group?
>>
>> Spencer (D) as AD
>>
>
>
>
>