Re: [nfsv4] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-15: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 11 April 2018 00:54 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 17:53:59 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBMhEHhV1ie=TNqrj_arupO=kd27houBpZgdqZw1pPMfww@mail.gmail.com>
To: Tom Haynes <loghyr@gmail.com>
Cc: Spencer Dawkins <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files@ietf.org, NFSv4 <nfsv4@ietf.org>, nfsv4-chairs@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [nfsv4] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-15: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 5:02 PM, Tom Haynes <loghyr@gmail.com> wrote:

> No, it does not have better security than typical NFS, it has the same
> security.
>

OK, then I'm confused about "degrades to"  Can you help me with that?


> The synthetic IDs control access to the files and the metadata server can
> modify them to fence off a rogue client*, but in the end, the security of
> any
> AUTH_SYS approach is limited.
>
> * By rogue client I do not mean malicious, I mean one which had established
> a connection with the metadata server, was handed a layout, and then when
> the layout was recalled, took over 91s to return that layout. It is
> probable that
> there is a network partition between the client and the metadata server and
> it is unknown if there is one between the client and the storage device.
> The
> fencing act causes the client to become aware that it needs to once again
> reach out to the metadata server.
>
> The security aspect of this version of the flex file layout type is to be
> as secure
> as any other NFS in a data center environment.
>
> The goal of the next version of the flex file layout type is to be as
> secure
> as any other NFS in the WAN. I.e., kerberized connections.
>
>
> On Apr 10, 2018, at 4:25 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
> Not entirely. I'm inferring from the following text that this draft is
> supposed to have somewhat better security than typical NFS, but it's
> not really clear.
>
>
>    If the configuration of the storage device is such that clients can
>    access the directory namespace, then the access control degrades to
>    that of a typical NFS server with exports with a security flavor of
>    AUTH_SYS.
>
> On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:43 AM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF <
> spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi, Eric,
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 2:56 PM, Tom Haynes <loghyr@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> Kathleen has removed her “discuss” from this document (the new version
>>> was pushed,
>>> which satisfied her need for the SecDir review.
>>>
>>> Could you please revisit your position on this draft?
>>>
>>
>> I'm just following up on this one - could you take a look at whether -17
>> addresses your Discuss position?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Spencer
>>
>> (diff from telechat version is https://tools.ietf.org/rfcd
>> iff?url1=draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-15.txt&url2=draft-ietf-
>> nfsv4-flex-files-17.txt)
>>
>
>
>