Re: [nfsv4] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-15: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Tom Haynes <[e-mail]>]

Hi Eric,

Thanks for bearing with me and the review. The changes are posted here:

A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-19.txt
has been successfully submitted by Thomas Haynes and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files
Revision:	19
Title:		Parallel NFS (pNFS) Flexible File Layout
Document date:	2018-05-03
Group:		nfsv4
Pages:		42
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-19.txt <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-19.txt>
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files/ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files/>
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-19 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-19>
Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files>
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-19 <https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-19>

Abstract:
  The Parallel Network File System (pNFS) allows a separation between
  the metadata (onto a metadata server) and data (onto a storage
  device) for a file.  The flexible file layout type is defined in this
  document as an extension to pNFS which allows the use of storage
  devices in a fashion such that they require only a quite limited
  degree of interaction with the metadata server, using already
  existing protocols.  Client-side mirroring is also added to provide
  replication of files.


Spencer S. I know Spencer D is going to ask if the WG is okay with the changes, so I’ll help
him out and ask away!

Tom


> On May 3, 2018, at 5:13 PM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> LGTM
> 
> On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 4:50 PM, Tom Haynes <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> More in line?
> 
> 
>     The combination of components in a pNFS system is required to
>     preserve the security properties of NFSv4.1+ with respect to
>     an entity accessing data via a client.  The pNFS feature
>     partitions the NFSv4.1+ file system protocol into two parts,
>     the control protocol and the data protocol.  As the control
>     protocol in this document is NFS, the security properties are
>     equivalent to that version of NFS.  The Flexible File
>     Layout further divides the data protocol into metadata and data
>     paths. The security properties of the metadata path are equivalent
>     to those of NFSv4.1x (see Sections 1.7.1 and 2.2.1 of
>     [RFC5661]).  And the security properties of the data
>     path are equivalent to those of the version of NFS used to
>     access the storage device, with the provision that the metadata
>     server is responsible for authenticating client access to the
>     data file.  The metadata server provides appropriate credentials
>     to the client to access data files on the storage device.  It
>     is also responsible for revoking access for a client to the
>     storage device.
> 
> 
>> On May 3, 2018, at 3:45 PM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>> 
>> I'm sorry, but I still find this really opaque.
>> 
>> What I'm looking for is a simple statement. Either "The security properties of the protocol described in this document are equivalent to those of NFS vX" 
>> or "The security properties of the protocol described in this document are equivalent to those of NFS vX if you do X, Y, and Z" or
>> "The security properties of the protocol described in this document are different from those of NFS vX in the following ways"
>> 
>> -Ekr
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 1:43 PM, Tom Haynes <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>> Hi Eric,
>> 
>> I haven’t seen a reply to this one.
>> 
>> The current draft-18 has the changes mentioned in this thread.
>> 
>> It has:
>> 
>> 
>>    The pNFS feature partitions the NFSv4.1+ file system protocol into
>>    two parts, the control path and the data path (storage protocol).
>>    The control path contains all the new operations described by this
>>    feature; all existing NFSv4 security mechanisms and features apply to
>>    the control path (see Sections 1.7.1 and 2.2.1 of [RFC5661]).  The
>>    combination of components in a pNFS system is required to preserve
>>    the security properties of NFSv4.1+ with respect to an entity
>>    accessing data via a client, including security countermeasures to
>>    defend against threats that NFSv4.1+ provides defenses for in
>>    environments where these threats are considered significant.
>> 
>>    The metadata server is primarily responsible for securing the data
>>    path.  It has to authenticate the client access and provide
>>    appropriate credentials to the client to access data files on the
>>    storage device.  Finally, it is responsible for revoking access for a
>>    client to the storage device.
>> 
>> Would having something like:
>> 
>>    The pNFS feature partitions the NFSv4.1+ file system protocol into
>>    two parts, the control path and the data path (storage protocol).
>>    The control path contains all the new operations described by this
>>    feature; all existing NFSv4 security mechanisms and features apply to
>>    the control path (see Sections 1.7.1 and 2.2.1 of [RFC5661]).  The
>>    combination of components in a pNFS system is required to preserve
>>    the security properties of NFSv4.1+ with respect to an entity
>>    accessing data via a client, including security countermeasures to
>>    defend against threats that NFSv4.1+ provides defenses for in
>>    environments where these threats are considered significant.
>> 
>>    The data path is also constrained to security mechanisms of the
>>    NFS version being used between the client and the storage
>>    device. The metadata server authenticates the client access and provides
>>    appropriate credentials to the client to access data files on the
>>    storage device.  Finally, it is responsible for revoking access for a
>>    client to the storage device.
>> 
>> be better for you?
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>> 
>>> On Apr 11, 2018, at 2:25 PM, Tom Haynes <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Hi Eric,
>>> 
>>> It is the same. 
>>> 
>>> Section 2.2:
>>> 
>>>    It is RECOMMENDED to implement common access control methods at the
>>>    storage device filesystem to allow only the metadata server root
>>>    (super user) access to the storage device, and to set the owner of
>>>    all directories holding data files to the root user.  This approach
>>>    provides a practical model to enforce access control and fence off
>>>    cooperative clients, but it can not protect against malicious
>>>    clients; hence it provides a level of security equivalent to
>>>    AUTH_SYS.  It is RECOMMENDED that the communication between the
>>>    metadata server and storage device be secure from eavesdroppers and
>>>    man-in-the-middle protocol tampering.  The security measure could be
>>>    due to physical security (e.g., the servers are co-located in a
>>>    physically secure area), from encrypted communications, or some other
>>>    technique.
>>> 
>>> (By the way, this contradicts the original text in my first paragraph below
>>> and is why we needed a change.)
>>> 
>>> And as for why, Section 15.1.1 discusses why RPCSEC_GSS is not
>>> provided in this version of the Flex File Layout Type.
>>> 
>>> Thanks,
>>> Tom
>>> 
>>>> On Apr 11, 2018, at 1:52 PM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Hi Tom.
>>>> 
>>>> This text is clear, but I fear it doesn't answer the question I asked in my discuss: how does the security here compare to ordinary NFS and why.
>>>> 
>>>> -Ekr
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 11:08 AM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>> Hi, Tom,
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 12:38 PM, Tom Haynes <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>> So actually, after thinking about, the discussion about securing the namespace on
>>>> the storage device is wrong.
>>>> 
>>>> The current text is:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>    The combination of file handle, synthetic uid, and gid in the layout
>>>>    are the way that the metadata server enforces access control to the
>>>>    data server.  The directory namespace on the storage device SHOULD
>>>>    only be accessible to the metadata server and not the clients.  In
>>>>    that case, the client only has access to file handles of file objects
>>>>    and not directory objects.  Thus, given a file handle in a layout, it
>>>>    is not possible to guess the parent directory file handle.  Further,
>>>>    as the data file permissions only allow the given synthetic uid read/
>>>>    write permission and the given synthetic gid read permission, knowing
>>>>    the synthetic ids of one file does not necessarily allow access to
>>>>    any other data file on the storage device.
>>>> 
>>>>    The metadata server can also deny access at any time by fencing the
>>>>    data file, which means changing the synthetic ids.  In turn, that
>>>>    forces the client to return its current layout and get a new layout
>>>>    if it wants to continue IO to the data file.
>>>> 
>>>>    If the configuration of the storage device is such that clients can
>>>>    access the directory namespace, then the access control degrades to
>>>>    that of a typical NFS server with exports with a security flavor of
>>>>    AUTH_SYS.  Any client which is allowed access can forge credentials
>>>>    to access any data file.  The caveat is that the rogue client might
>>>>    have no knowledge of the data file's type or position in the metadata
>>>>    directory namespace.
>>>> 
>>>> My replacement would be:
>>>> 
>>>>    The combination of file handle, synthetic uid, and gid in the layout
>>>>    are the way that the metadata server enforces access control to the
>>>>    data server.  The client only has access to file handles of file
>>>>    objects and not directory objects.  Thus, given a file handle in a
>>>>    layout, it is not possible to guess the parent directory file handle.
>>>>    Further, as the data file permissions only allow the given synthetic
>>>>    uid read/write permission and the given synthetic gid read
>>>>    permission, knowing the synthetic ids of one file does not
>>>>    necessarily allow access to any other data file on the storage
>>>>    device.
>>>> 
>>>>    The metadata server can also deny access at any time by fencing the
>>>>    data file, which means changing the synthetic ids.  In turn, that
>>>>    forces the client to return its current layout and get a new layout
>>>>    if it wants to continue IO to the data file.
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks for proposing new text here.
>>>> 
>>>> Spencer (S) as shepherd and WG co-chair, does this look like something that would come as a surprise to the working group?
>>>> 
>>>> Spencer (D) as AD
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
>