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Re: [nfsv4] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-08: (with COMMENT)

Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Fri, 03 July 2020 15:57 UTC

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From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Date: Fri, 03 Jul 2020 11:57:33 -0400
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls@ietf.org, nfsv4-chairs@ietf.org, nfsv4@ietf.org, David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com>
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To: Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [nfsv4] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-08: (with COMMENT)
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> On Jul 2, 2020, at 2:26 PM, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Jul 2, 2020, at 2:08 PM, Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> I was more curious about text for how a TCP RPC server identifies TLS
>> ClientHello from the first of possibly several unencrypted RPCs after
>> the 3WHS.  And it seems like the same "try to parse a ClientHello else
>> try to parse an ONC RPC message"  is the recommended approach
>> (analogous to DTLS above)?  It was a statement to this effect that I
>> was after.

I propose updating the first paragraph of Section 5.1.1:

OLD:

   The use of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [RFC8446]
   protects RPC on TCP connections.  Typically, once an RPC client
   completes the TCP handshake, it uses the mechanism described in
   Section 4.1 to discover RPC-over-TLS support for that connection.  If
   spurious traffic appears on a TCP connection between the initial
   clear-text AUTH_TLS probe and the TLS session handshake, receivers
   MUST discard that data without response and then SHOULD drop the
   connection.

NEW:

   The use of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [RFC8446]
   protects RPC on TCP connections.  Typically, once an RPC client
   completes the TCP handshake, it uses the mechanism described in
   Section 4.1 to discover RPC-over-TLS support for that connection.
   Until an AUTH_TLS probe is done on a connection, the RPC server
   treats all traffic as RPC messages.  If spurious traffic appears on a
   TCP connection between the initial clear-text AUTH_TLS probe and the
   TLS session handshake, receivers MUST discard that data without
   response and then SHOULD drop the connection.


--
Chuck Lever

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