Re: [nfsv4] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-08: (with COMMENT)

Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 01 July 2020 19:24 UTC

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From: Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 12:24:30 -0700
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To: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls@ietf.org, nfsv4-chairs@ietf.org, nfsv4@ietf.org, David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [nfsv4] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-08: (with COMMENT)
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> > * What mechanism guarantees that (D)TLS traffic can always and easily be
> >  distinguished from RPC traffic on the same port?
>
> The document does not specify any mechanism for making that distinction
> for UDP. The server would have to match ingress datagrams that appear to
> be DTLS traffic to existing DTLS session state. The server treats datagrams
> that fail to match as RPC messages.
>
> For TCP, once a TLS session is established on a connection, the client is
> forbidden from mixing TLS traffic with unprotected traffic on that
> connection. To send unprotected traffic after establishing a session, a
> client would have to establish a separate TCP connection that does not
> have a TLS session.

This might be something worth a few sentences.

> > [[ nits ]]
> >
> > [ section 5.1.1 ]
> >
> > * "When operation is complete" ... In addition to a grammar tweak, you
> >  might repeat a few choice words from section 7.2 about the ability to
> >  send multiple requests over a connection.
>
> I don't understand this comment. Section 7.2 is about user privilege
> separation. What did you have in mind?

I was just thinking that it would be useful to add a sentence to
dispel any ideas that it's a "one TLS connection, one request" system.
7.2 explicitly talks about sending multiple requests per session:

"""
   Moreover, client implementations are free to transmit RPC requests
   for more than one RPC user using the same TLS session.
"""