Re: [nfsv4] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-15: (with DISCUSS)

Thomas Haynes <loghyr@gmail.com> Thu, 25 January 2018 07:57 UTC

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From: Thomas Haynes <loghyr@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 23:56:54 -0800
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Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files@ietf.org, nfsv4-chairs@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, NFSv4 <nfsv4@ietf.org>
To: Spencer Dawkins <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [nfsv4] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-15: (with DISCUSS)
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> On Jan 24, 2018, at 8:58 PM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Cool.
> 
> On Jan 24, 2018 20:29, "Kathleen Moriarty" <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> First off, I was less concerned about this point than the proposed
> text discussed and other points. Having said that...
> 
> On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 6:47 PM, Spencer Dawkins at IETF
> <spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > Kathleen and EKR,
> >
> >
> > On Jan 24, 2018 16:25, "Tom Haynes" <loghyr@gmail.com <mailto:loghyr@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >
> > I purposely did not update the document to avoid confusion during this
> > process.
> >
> > There was an unanswered question in my last reply, namely concerning the use
> > of SHOULD versus MUST in the 3rd sentence below:
> >
> >    It is RECOMMENDED to implement common access control methods at the
> >    storage device filesystem to allow only the metadata server root
> >    (super user) access to the storage device, and to set the owner of
> >    all directories holding data files to the root user.  This approach
> >    provides a practical model to enforce access control and fence off
> >    cooperative clients, but it can not protect against malicious
> >    clients; hence it provides a level of security equivalent to
> >    AUTH_SYS.  Communications between the metadata server and file server
> >    SHOULD be secure from eavesdroppers and man-in-the-middle protocol
> >    tampering.  The security measure could be due to physical security
> >    (e.g., the servers are co-located in a physically secure area), from
> >    encrypted communications, or some other technique.
> >
> 
> I think rephrasing to RECOMMENDED would be good here.

Hi Kathleen,

I think you are proposing:

It is RECOMMENDED that the communication between the metadata server and storage device be secure ….


> 
> So, Thomas, do you have any more questions I should be chasing?
> 

Hi Spencer,

Yes, what is the difference between SHOULD and RECOMMENDED? It must be a nuance I am missing...

From RFC2119, I don’t see the difference.
3. SHOULD   This word, or the adjective "RECOMMENDED", mean that there
   may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a
   particular item, but the full implications must be understood and
   carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
BTW - the text above is from the proposed 16th copy of the draft. Once we get past this issue,
I will submit it.

Thanks,
Tom


> Spencer
> 
> 
> Thank you,
> Kathleen
> 
> >
> >> On Jan 24, 2018, at 8:42 AM, Kathleen Moriarty
> >> <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >> Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
> >> draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files-15: Discuss
> >>
> >> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> >> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> >> introductory paragraph, however.)
> >>
> >>
> >> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html <https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html>
> >> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >>
> >>
> >> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files/ <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-flex-files/>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> DISCUSS:
> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> Thanks for your response to the SecDir review.  I see the proposed changes
> >> have
> >> not been integrated yet.  This discuss will be resolved when the SecDir
> >> review
> >> changes have been included.
> >>
> >
> > I purposely did not update the document to avoid confusion during this
> > process.
> >
> > There was an unanswered question in my last reply, namely concerning the use
> > of SHOULD versus MUST in the 3rd sentence below:
> >
> >    It is RECOMMENDED to implement common access control methods at the
> >    storage device filesystem to allow only the metadata server root
> >    (super user) access to the storage device, and to set the owner of
> >    all directories holding data files to the root user.  This approach
> >    provides a practical model to enforce access control and fence off
> >    cooperative clients, but it can not protect against malicious
> >    clients; hence it provides a level of security equivalent to
> >    AUTH_SYS.  Communications between the metadata server and file server
> >    SHOULD be secure from eavesdroppers and man-in-the-middle protocol
> >    tampering.  The security measure could be due to physical security
> >    (e.g., the servers are co-located in a physically secure area), from
> >    encrypted communications, or some other technique.
> >
> >
> > Do you folks have any thoughts about whether "secure from eavesdroppers"
> > ought to be SHOULD or MUST?
> >
> > IIUC, Thomas was reluctant to specify MUST ... and since we're saying that
> > co-location in a secure area is one of the options, I'm not sure why this
> > would be either SHOULD or MUST in the first place.
> >
> > Conformance test cases for that requirement would be a riot ... :-)
> >
> > Spencer
> >
> >> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/HKdT2KjnWJFmzEPxlGcNH0OnUDg <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/HKdT2KjnWJFmzEPxlGcNH0OnUDg>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> nfsv4 mailing list
> >> nfsv4@ietf.org <mailto:nfsv4@ietf.org>
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nfsv4 <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nfsv4>
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > nfsv4 mailing list
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> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nfsv4 <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nfsv4>
> >
> >
> 
> 
> 
> --
> 
> Best regards,
> Kathleen