[Ntp] Roughtime actually bounds the time

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Thu, 27 June 2019 22:56 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 15:56:15 -0700
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Subject: [Ntp] Roughtime actually bounds the time
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I finally have demonstrated the obvious: that roughtime bounds the
time difference between client and server, and this bound is easily
propagated forward in time given bounds on frequency stability (with
fairly simple formulas).  Driving a PLL crudely is also possible (one
gets a measurement, applies it, can go again: with sufficient
robustness in the loop this will work).

Many applications don't need to do this, e.g. certificate validation,
freshness of consensus etc. only need a crude check on accuracy.

I will hopefully determine text and upload a new version shortly. I
would appreciate input on what exactly people found lacking in prior
discussions of the security model.

Sincerely,
Watson