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Re: [Ntp] A simpler way to secure PTP

Heiko Gerstung <heiko.gerstung@meinberg.de> Wed, 12 May 2021 05:15 UTC

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Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 07:14:48 +0200
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Thread-Topic: [Ntp] A simpler way to secure PTP
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From: Heiko Gerstung <heiko.gerstung@meinberg.de>
To: Daniel Franke <dfoxfranke@gmail.com>
Cc: NTP WG <ntp@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] A simpler way to secure PTP
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Hi Daniel,

 

that’s why we use the integrated security mechanism for unicast PTP and just use the NTS-KE protocol to exchange the required keys for that. Due to the fact that the two protocols NTP and PTP work in a completely different way, there is not more that can be reused. I agree we could find another way to exchange keys and it doesn’t have to be NTS. But why not using it, now that it is there? 

 

Regards,

  Heiko

 

 


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Von: ntp <ntp-bounces@ietf.org> im Auftrag von Daniel Franke <dfoxfranke@gmail.com>
Datum: Dienstag, 11. Mai 2021 um 21:40
An: Heiko Gerstung <heiko.gerstung@meinberg.de>
Cc: NTP WG <ntp@ietf.org>
Betreff: Re: [Ntp] A simpler way to secure PTP

 

On Tue, May 11, 2021 at 3:14 AM Heiko Gerstung <heiko.gerstung@meinberg.de> wrote:

However, especially unicast PTP is a great traffic amplification tool, maybe one of the biggest traffic amplification machines of all times. And I also believe that it would be great to (re)use the general concepts of NTS to secure the other popular time transfer protocol out there.

 

Amplification is definitely worth fixing, but ISTM this should be orthogonal to the NTS effort. You don't need message authentication for that, you just need the client to prove (and maybe occasionally re-prove) that it's able to receive packets at a particular IP address. There may be some crypto involved in doing so (a la TCP SYN cookies), but it doesn't have to be related to NTS crypto, and servers shouldn't have to require all their clients to support NTS just to prevent themselves from being exploited for amplification.

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