Re: [Ntp] Antwort: Re: A simpler way to secure PTP

[Heiko Gerstung <[e-mail]>]

Joachim,

thanks for the provided document references. Both are focusing on multicast operation of NTP and PTP, is that correct? At least that is what I understood from the introduction paragraphs of both papers. 

Regards,
  Heiko


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Am 11.05.21, 09:59 schrieb "ntp im Auftrag von Joachim Fabini" <[e-mail] im Auftrag von [e-mail]>:

    On 5/10/21 7:05 PM, [e-mail] wrote:
    > @Doug: Daniel is correct; you can apply all kinds of magic, but 
    > ultimately, your hard, 100% certain guarantees are going to be at best 
    > "half of RTT" for two-way time transfer and "none at all" for one-way 
    > transfer.

    "At best" is too little. 100% certain guarantees (for two-way time sync) 
    apply for *RTT* - and definitely *not* for half of RTT. The link 
    symmetry assumption is one of the weakest point of today's network time 
    synchronization protocols that malicious actors can exploit.

    By knowing physical link properties (delay, capacity) one can restrict 
    the RTT bound and decrease the limits. However, attackers could - in 
    theory and practice - exploit this assumption, too (for instance by 
    inserting new (faster-than)-light-speed paths).

    If anyone is interested: theoretical aspects (and practical 
    consequences) of securing time sync protocols against malicious actors 
    can be found in an older paper (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.10669.pdf) 
    and in parts of the subsequent PhD thesis 
    (https://www.annessi.net/data/2019-Annessi_thesis.pdf).

    regards
    Joachim


    > 
    > -----"ntp" <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> schrieb: 
    > -----
    > An: "Daniel Franke" <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
    > Von: "Doug Arnold"
    > Gesendet von: "ntp"
    > Datum: 10.05.2021 18:19
    > Kopie: "Miroslav Lichvar" <[e-mail] 
    > <mailto:[e-mail]>>, "NTP WG" <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
    > Betreff: Re: [Ntp] A simpler way to secure PTP
    > 
    > Many of the applications of PTP I know of require time transfer accuracy 
    > better than half the RTT.  This is achieved using a variety of 
    > mechanisms, including:
    > 
    >   * On-path support
    > 
    >   * High message rates + lucky packet filters
    > 
    >   * Synchronous Ethernet
    > 
    >   * Networks with lightly loaded switches
    > 
    >   * Preemptive switches
    > 
    >   * Asymmetry calibration
    > 
    >   * Multiple PTP domains with different paths to devices needing time
    > 
    >   * Multiple sources of time, that is PTP, plus other non-PTP time
    >     transfer mechanisms in a redundant system
    > 
    > A switch in the middle could mount a delay attack, which is of course 
    > immune to cryptography, but the risk could be reduced by 
    > non-cryptographic defenses such as time source, or network path redundancy.
    > 
    > NTS4PTP could help against malicious agents which have gained access to 
    > the network and start sending bogus PTP messages, for example 
    > impersonating the Grandmaster.
    > 
    > Doug
    > 
    > *From: *Daniel Franke <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
    > *Date: *Monday, May 10, 2021 at 11:21 AM
    > *To: *Doug Arnold <[e-mail] 
    > <mailto:[e-mail]>>
    > *Cc: *Miroslav Lichvar <[e-mail] 
    > <mailto:[e-mail]>>, NTP WG <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
    > *Subject: *Re: [Ntp] A simpler way to secure PTP
    > 
    > On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 10:43 AM Doug Arnold 
    > <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
    > 
    >     I have heard of people actually doing this in the field as a sanity
    >     check.
    > 
    >     However, some applications that use PTP can be broken by introducing
    >     timing errors that are less than the expected difference between PTP
    >     and NTP.
    > 
    > You cannot solve this with cryptography. An adversarial network is, by 
    > definition, one where you can't rely on statistical behavior and can't 
    > neglect the probability of worst-case outcomes. The worst-case outcome 
    > for any unicast protocol is going to be at least half the measured RTT, 
    > and for a broadcast protocol the worst case is unbounded. As I've 
    > mentioned before, you can improve this a little bit if you know a lower 
    > bound on the physical distance `d` between the client and server, in 
    > which case you can shrink each of your bounds by `d/c` where `c` is the 
    > speed of light, but this still won't get you anywhere near the kind of 
    > precision you have in mind. If worst-case, let alone typical-case, 
    > NTS4NTP behavior is going to break your application in critical ways, 
    > then you MUST have a physically-secure link to your time source. If you 
    > have an adversary on your communication path, you're just screwed and 
    > cryptography can't save you.
    > 
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