[Ntp] PSK Data Priorities (c)RS
Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com> Sat, 14 January 2023 23:17 UTC
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From: Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Jan 2023 23:16:56 +0000
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Subject: [Ntp] PSK Data Priorities (c)RS
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PSK Data Priorities (c)RS PSK are relatively important to older generations of mobile telephone calls, while this is the case the properties of PSK; Fast, Light cpu usage, good GZip compression & quality call qualities with low latency (cpu bottlenecks), Make PSK a priority for GSM & mobile phone connection priority & long term connection properties : Radar, Communications towers, Radio, GSM, Space & Air & shipping. PS Open PSK is useful for verifying Global positioning & also shipping forecasts & Open Map travel data from observatories. Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com Date: Sat, Jan 14, 2023 at 9:31 PM Subject: you can still use clefia on the psn network & personally on calls though sony phones, i am sure samsung & lg would be interested! Rotating PSK Script & NTP. (c)RS Everyone heard the story of the harrier & the 80Bit PSK? Well copy & paste is the issue! You can negotiate a lower security & grab upto 15 64Bit PSK's for the Raidar and be relatively safe with TLS/SSL PSK Recommended length 120Bit PSK Lengths: 8 Characters to 128 ASCII : HARRIER 80Bit MAXUS You can rotate them every 5 minutes to NTP clock, Set Rule; Grabe time; Set timer : Go Go Go expedition! No need to have a fallen communications tower or exposed radar with the rotating PSK Script & NTP. (c)RS results matter, So here are some examples : https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=d.ns4v.icu&latest https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=dns-v2.ns4v.icu&latest When i say verified - you can see : SSL | TSL https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/155895c95b81f7f0977c44c4f3ac8e7c24b339db7ae1a4790cfd843588c0c6f6/details https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b4e2f4cf9aa01e1b33cb4b3950b0134d90052c2c27705abb02431eaa646ca8b9/details When i say verified - you can see : SSL | TSL : Good for 3G, 4G, 5G because we need ssl there https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI Device Security CRT Initiations for URT, USB, Wireless & other Device Interactions : (c)RS A very good way to think about a mouse, Keyboard & device AES & Crypto security is that a device needs to be in the certificate store, Two reasons Hardware acceleration is OS Store & Security; The device(computer) specifically requests all interactions with the CRT with a level of privacy & security, By GUID Definition & identity; Secondly limiting the function to parameters so it will not hack the system.. So firstly the device certificate needs to interact with a store for a temporary cert & therefore we need a device Certificate store that contains the equivalent of the Secure client key in SHELL, This does not need to worry us; But we need a store! if not the device driver needs to initiate the system Store DL & AES Systems so that the device is secured with a personal store & main key (probably ECC-AES-'GCM<>FF3-1' ) Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/jit-dongle.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/06/jit-compiler.html ***** ((network server)Effectively Improves Phone & network SSL Connectivity & thus +security) (good for telecommunications networks) (TLS) My files are all verified by virustotal & are signed anyway! https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI TLS Optimised https://drive.google.com/file/d/10XL19eGjxdCGj0tK8MULKlgWhHa9_5v9/view?usp=share_link RS ***** *********** (in comparison Poly & AES is quite good for 32Bit USB Mice (small channel) Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements : RS Lightweight Cryptography https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3 CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114 ARIA : Random is a big+ to anomininity bit 128Bit's of data https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794 ARIA is conformant https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209 ARIA SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14 ************ AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/ https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15 Correct Time : EEC Elliptic & Nonce timer function: "The thing about random unique nonce with :dev/rng is that verifying the nonce's uniqueness is an issue, with SSRTP nonce, Time intrinsics allow only one play time https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ So what about if they have a reset phone & have not got the correct time ? mine wouldn't do NTP until i set it to pools.ntp.org, the telephone network would not change the time!" So the nonce may need a seconds from arrival timer; So that it is from the time it arrives (in your terms) & additionally a sent and arrival time so that when you get the correct time; It still works! In essence TLS & OSCP need a time from arrival (to verify link/Security CRT), It does not matter if that NTP timer is off by 5 Minutes... you can use the Time related EEC Elliptic curve & as long as it is timed from arrival & sends back a sample with a from time & until... That EEC Elliptic & Nonce will work. RS ***** sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html Code Speed https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html Chaos https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ RSA-PSS RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756 PSK: Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/ Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP Nonce is compatible) https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/ https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15 AES-GCM SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/ AES-CCM https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/ Lightweight Cryptography https://www.cryptrec.go.jp/report/cryptrec-gl-2003-2016en.pdf https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2014/49006/49006.pdf Performance Evaluation Comparison LIGHTWEIGHT CIPHERS NIST LightWeight Cryptography Requirements https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/k0698968b AES-NI Compatible Ciphers : AES, ARIA, CLEFIA https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog-01#page-3 CLEFIA : Large size table, Pure function https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6114 ARIA : Random is a big+ to anonymity bit 128Bit's of data https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5794 ARIA is conformant https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6209 ARIA SRTP https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8269#page-14 Compact TLS 1.3 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/ DTLS 2023 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/ TLS 1.2 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/ Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/ https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html https://is.gd/SecurityHSM https://is.gd/WebPKI
- [Ntp] PSK Data Priorities (c)RS Duke Abbaddon