Re: [Ntp] Of Roughtime's algorithm agility, and host attestation

"Patrik Fältström " <paf@frobbit.se> Sat, 27 July 2019 06:32 UTC

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From: "Patrik =?utf-8?b?RsOkbHRzdHLDtm0=?=" <paf@frobbit.se>
To: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Cc: "Patrik =?utf-8?b?RsOkbHRzdHLDtm0=?=" <paf=40frobbit.se@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "Robert Nagy" <rob@deepdivenetworking.com>, "NTP WG" <ntp@ietf.org>, "Thomas Peterson" <nosretep.samoht@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2019 08:32:52 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] Of Roughtime's algorithm agility, and host attestation
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On 27 Jul 2019, at 7:58, Watson Ladd wrote:

> It seems people are misunderstanding the trust relationship here. The goal is to have publically observable, auditable performance and identities tied to that. So it makes very little sense to link these identities to another naming system, but maybe this is a better idea then it seems. In particular public keys really shouldn't change: that could permit the laundering of errors, which we very much don't want.

Ahhh...ok, sorry. I did not write enough words.

I agree with the base idea in what you write here. One should be careful on what one trust. But, one also need to base the trust on something, some root.

This can of course as some have suggested a cert for some time service one trust. Or the root CA of something else. Like root in some other naming system.

My answer was "just" responding to the question whether we should in the case some cert is stored in DNS create a new RRType, which is something I find not necessary as TLSA exists.

   Patrik