Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt - geneve options
"Ganga, Ilango S" <ilango.s.ganga@intel.com> Wed, 27 March 2019 05:30 UTC
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From: "Ganga, Ilango S" <ilango.s.ganga@intel.com>
To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
CC: NVO3 <nvo3@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt - geneve options
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Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt - geneve options
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Hi Daniel, We updated the draft to restate the requirement on options processing, the revised text is much simpler, provides better clarity, and retains the original intent. We believe, this should address your concerns. https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/nvo3/-jwq1fjwDufvPl8Qcbk7Iheiegg Revised text: “An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independently of one another. Architecturally, options are intended to be self- descriptive and independent. This enables parallelism in option processing and reduces implementation complexity.” Thanks Ilango From: Daniel Migault [mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 1:56 PM To: Ganga, Ilango S <ilango.s.ganga@intel.com> Cc: NVO3 <nvo3@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt - geneve options Hi, I am looking at the version 12 and see how it address my concern, regarding the integration of security options. The new text in version 12 mentions: """ o An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another. An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any other option. However, option processing by tunnel endpoints may result in the packet being dropped. Options may also be used in conjunction with each other or combined with packet data but this processing is done above the encapsulation layer. """ I am reading the text as a security option can be combined with another option or the data payload. More specifically, an authentication option that authenticates some options and/or the payload may result in the packet to be discarded or not. I think we are making progress. However, I am not clear about the text: """ but this processing is done above the encapsulation layer.""" I am reading the encapsulation layer as the Geneve protocol, but I am not clear what the layer above is. I am assuming that is a layer that takes the output of the Geneve decapsulation. If that is correct, I understand the text saying Geneve processes the options even though the authentication has failed. Typically, suppose option A covers options O. Upon verification of A fails, Geneve processes O and returns to some upper layers that O has been processed while its authentication did not succeed. I am sure that I misunderstood the text, but I suggest some clarification are provided to prevent such interpretation as the purpose of the authenticating O MUST be able to prevent the processing of the option O. In the current text I believe the text """but ...layer""" can be removed. Another way might be to clarify the layer above the encapsulation. Yours, Daniel On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 9:44 PM Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com<mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com>> wrote: Hi, Thanks for the response. Let me first recap the previous conversation, or at least my perception of them. My initial comment was that the current Geneve specification prevents the design of security options and I provided an example. My understanding is there is an agreement that such option is prevented by the current geneve specification and you challenge the usefulness of such an option (designated as A) as well as argue that an authentication upon failure MUST result in discarding the packet. The security options considered has been mentioned in two independent security analysis. The example has been described and commented extensively in the threat analysis as well. I argue further that mandating that dropping the packet, in our case is neither a decision that can be taken at the option level, nor at the geneve level. Instead, it belongs to a policy decision that is likely to result in incoherent deployments. As result, the current geneve specification prevents security options. Please see below for more additional information. The current option works similarly to IPsec: IPsec/ESP is IP option. AH is an option that authenticates the full IP packet. ESP authenticate/encrypt the IP payload and not the full packet. Upon authentication failure *the scope of the authentication* is discarded and in that sense the example I am providing is no more different. In our case, the option authenticate an portion of the geneve packet that is limited to the option. Tthe coverage of the security option is a portion of the geneve header. As such, the option cannot mandate anything outside of its coverage: the covered option O. As a result, dropping the full packet is outside of the scope. Mandating a packet drop hardly, in my opinion apply here. Options are usually non critical for interoperability. Mandating to drop the packet when option O cannot be authenticated would contradict the non critical status of that option, which is the packet can be processed without the option. This would be a policy that overwrite the geneve - as well as the geneve option - specification. A possible incoherence would be if option A and O are non critical would be that the implementation ignoring the option A and O will accept the packet, an implementation understanding option O but not option A will accept the packet while the implementation understanding option A and O will reject the packet. Yours, Daniel On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 9:33 PM Ganga, Ilango S <ilango.s.ganga@intel.com<mailto:ilango.s.ganga@intel.com>> wrote: Hi Daniel, Please see my responses inline below. Thanks, Ilango From: nvo3 [mailto:nvo3-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Daniel Migault Sent: Monday, March 4, 2019 9:15 AM To: Ganga, Ilango S <ilango.s.ganga@intel.com<mailto:ilango.s.ganga@intel.com>> Cc: nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt Hi Ilango, Thanks for the response. Please see a concrete example to illustrate my concern for comment 1. For comment 2, it really helped you indicated that Geneve is expected to be an end-to-end protocol. This will help me update the security requirement document. However, the current Geneve specification with transit devices seems - at least to me - to raise an architecture concern as raised in [1]. -- comment 1: Thanks for the feed back. I understand the purpose of keeping option independent one from each other, and favour this is strongly recommended. However, I am not convinced this applies always. More specifically, in a context of security, the purpose of a security option may be related to another option. Typically, a security option providing authentication or encryption is potentially authenticating/encryption another option or other information contained in the header. The typical scenario I have in mind would be an authentication option A authenticating option O. There will clearly some dependencies between A and O as O could only be used if A has been primarily been validated. The current statement "SHOULD NOT be dependent" enables this. However, I have concerns regarding the statement "MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation". In fact, the output of A, will determine if O should be dropped or processed normally. In case A shows O is not appropriately authenticated, O might be rejected based on its C value. The ambiguity I see is that A can be understood as affecting the parsing and interpretation of O or as a pre-processing operation before parsing or interpretation of O. I think, the text needs further clarifications to remove such ambiguity. Changing MUST NOT by SHOULD NOT was of course only one proposition and this could be also addressed otherwise. It might be better, I agree, to explicitly mention that some options may provide condition on the parsing of the options. This would leave the parsing of the options unchanged. <Ilango> If I understand your example correctly, you want to have one option authenticate the contents of another option and if that authentication fails, drop the option. This would not drop the entire packet unless that option is critical. Can you give a use case for this? This seems unusual and not something that is supported by other security protocols such as IPsec or TLS to the best of our knowledge. I believe a more common outcome of a failed authentication is that the entire packet would be dropped. As previously noted, the current text does not preclude this. It seems like going beyond this would result in significant complexity, both for processing options in this specific case as well as the possibility of introducing ambiguity in how other options might be defined or processed as an unintended consequence. Without a strong use case, this does not seem desirable. </> -- comment 2: Thanks for the response that clarifies a bit my understanding of the transit devices.. I believe the issue I have is related to the transit devices which I do not see, unless I am wrong, meeting the requirements for being OPTIONAL and that seems - at least to me - contradicting the status of end-to-end protocol. As suggested in [1], transit devices seem to raise architectural concerns that is not needed. You are correct that the text is clear that transit devices are OPTIONAL. However, my understanding of OPTIONAL from 2119 is that there are two sides of it. One is that a vendor may implement it or not, but the other side is that interoperability with other implementations are not affected. In this case, two Geneve endpoints using TLS or IPsec will not be able to interoperate with an implementation based on transit devices (unless the process being performed by the transit devices is also performed by the NVE). In that sense, I believe OPTIONAL statement is not appropriated here. An implementation with transit devices seems to prevent the interoperability of with an implementation where options are treated by the NVE over a secure channel. If we suppose that NVE and transit devices support the same options, then transit devices are not necessary and could be removed from the specification. If options supported by transit devices are different from those supported by the NVE, interoperability will not be achieved. Transit device will not be able to process the options, resulting in options will be ignored (while being supported by the implementation).. In addition, if the options are critical, the NVE is likely to drop the packet as it does not support the option. In addition, I have some hard time to understand the end-to-end model with a transit device even optional. I believe that end-to-end protocol is a good path, though. However, my understanding of end-to-end protocol is that they should only involve two end points. I see the NVE as end points but the optional transit device does not seems to be one of these. However, to help me understand better this, as it seems Geneve is similar to other end-to-end protocol, maybe you could provide similar end-to-end protocol that involves a transit devices or something similar. I also have another clarification regarding transit device. I see these transit devices as adding a lot of complexity to the end-to-end model with little benefits. Typically, as far as I understand, they can only read an option. I am thus wondering whether we should not be better off removing them from the specification. This would end up with a clear end-to-end model. Reversely, I do not see anything preventing a vendor to implement them at least for unsecure deployments. Removing them from the specification would leave the transit devices as implementation specific. What are actually the benefits of the transit devices that would justify them to be part of the specification? <Ilango> Transit devices exists in the underlay network, these are simply forwarding elements (e.g. switches, routers) that generally forwards packets based on outer header information, there is nothing that stops such devices from reading the contents if the data is in the clear. This works with any transport protocols like IP, IP in IP, GRE, VXLAN, etc. For example, routers may look at headers and/or inner payload for ECMP purposes or for statistics or logging purposes. If the packet is encrypted then such transit devices cannot look into the packets but would simply forward based on the outer headers and use information in outer headers for entropy. There is no interoperability issue between the endpoints. Geneve is no different. Recognizing the fact that such a device is anyway going to exist in the network, Geneve draft provides guidance on how to handle Geneve headers (if a device has the option to do so). Geneve options are part of Geneve header, a transit device that is capable of interpreting Geneve headers may interpret an option or skip over the option to view the payload, etc. If a transit device is not able interpret the header or option, it has to simply use the outer header to forward the packet (outer IP/UDP). This is what the Geneve draft clarifies. These guidelines reduce possible interoperability issues compared to if behavior was left undefined. For example, transit devices are not allowed to drop packets or fall back to a slow path on the basis of an unknown option. If this were to happen, it would hamper the introduction of new options. It might also be worth mentioning that anything that could be considered a middlebox is not a transit device but needs to be modeled as an endpoint and so Geneve really should be viewed as a tunnel endpoint-to-endpoint protocol. <end> [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/nvo3/ekLofhq8erRLE_Msuk8N_SCdhcs Yours, Daniel On Sat, Mar 2, 2019 at 8:18 PM Ganga, Ilango S <ilango.s.ganga@intel.com<mailto:ilango.s.ganga@intel.com>> wrote: Hi Daniel, Let us be specific. I see that you have two comments on the latest draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-09. Please see below for responses to your comments. Comment 1: OLD o An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another. An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any other option. NEW o An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another. An option SHOULD NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any other option. <Ilango> Architecturally Geneve options can be processed independent of one another. The second statement clearly states that parsing or interpretation of one option must not affect the other. This is a reasonable constraint to avoid nested dependencies. Options can be designed to work with the requirements specified in Geneve. Let us take specific examples: We could think of a design of a Header Integrity check option (related to your example). In this case if the header integrity check fails, as a result the entire header is invalid and hence the most likely outcome of a failed check is that the packet being dropped (including any options in that packet whether parsed/interpreted or not). The current text does not preclude the packet being dropped as result of failure. It is possible to design options, including any security options, with these constraints. We don’t see a reason to change this requirement that may have unintended consequences. Comment 2: NEW Security Consideration Geneve Overlay may be secured using by protecting the NVE-to-NVE communication using IPsec or DTLS. However, such mechanisms cannot be applied for deployments that include transit devices.. Some deployment may not be able to secure the full communication using IPsec or DTLS between the NVEs. This could be motivated by the presence of transit devices or by a risk analysis that concludes that the Geneve packet be only partially protected - typically reduced to the Geneve Header information. In such cases Geneve specific mechanisms needs to be designed. <Ilango> The challenge is, you are asking to impose requirements that is not supported by Geneve architecture. Geneve has an optional feature where transit devices may be able to interpret Geneve options. However this is not a requirement for Geneve operation between tunnel end point to tunnel end point. We have tried make this very clear by adding clarifying text during the last two revisions. If the Geneve packet is in the clear then transit devices may be able to view the Genve header, options, and the payload. However if the packet is encrypted then transit devices cannot view the packet contents. This is consistent with other transport protocols encrypting the packets. So we don’t see a reason why Geneve should be different. Geneve is an end to end protocol between tunnel endpoints and the NVEs decide to secure (encrypt) the packets between tunnel endpoints. If a middle box has a need to see an encrypted packet, then it has to implement tunnel endpoint functionality. We already have text in 6.4 security consideration section that provides clear guidance to the operators. So we don’t see a good reason to add the suggested text above. For a complete threat analysis, a security analysis of Geneve or some guide lines to secure a Geneve overlay network, please refer to [draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirements] as well as [draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements]. <Ilango> The security requirements document makes certain assumptions that is unsupported by Geneve architecture. We have tried to clarify this multiple times, however you have still maintained this in the requirements document. So this needs to be addressed. Also the document is not yet adopted by the working group. Moreover, Geneve security consideration section has been significantly enhanced to provide guidance to operators and to address the comments. So both documents can progress independently. Thanks, Ilango From: Daniel Migault [mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com<mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com>] Sent: Saturday, March 2, 2019 8:49 AM To: Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB) <matthew.bocci@nokia.com<mailto:matthew.bocci@nokia.com>> Cc: draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org>; Pankaj Garg <pankajg=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>; NVO3 <nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>> Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt Hi Matt, You are correct, this is at least not an regular process to have a standard track document being updated by an informational. I do not see either any requirements for having a WG status to become a reference, but that is something we could confirm with the RFC-editor. Back to the initial suggestion, I also believe the difficulties of updating the Geneve specifications are far less complex than updating the implementation, and for that specific reason, it would be good we have a consensus on the security analyse. I agree that WG draft would be better, and RFC would be even better as we have seen WG document being stalled. I am confident we can make this happen or at least I do not see major issues. Yours, Daniel On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 11:51 AM Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB) <matthew.bocci@nokia.com<mailto:matthew.bocci@nokia.com>> wrote: WG, Daniel, Apologies but I mis-spoke on the suggestion for the security requirements to act as an update to the encapsulation RFC in future. This would be difficult to do as it is informational. Nonetheless I think we should only be referencing a WG draft (at a minimum) here. Matthew From: Dacheng Zhang <nvo3-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of "Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)" <matthew.bocci@nokia.com<mailto:matthew.bocci@nokia.com>> Date: Friday, 1 March 2019 at 16:24 To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com<mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com>> Cc: "draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org>" <draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org>>, Pankaj Garg <pankajg=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>, NVO3 <nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>> Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt Daniel From a procedural perspective, referring to your draft creates a dependency and that draft has not yet been adopted by the WG. The old Security requirements framework expired a couple of years ago and does not seem to be being progressed. Maybe a better approach to allow progress, as long as the WG can agree to your text (if needed) to satisfy the concern that future security mechanisms can be used, and that the evolving threat analysis is understood by implementers and users of Geneve, would be to mark the Geneve security requirements as an update to the geneve encapsulation RFC when it is published. Matthew From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com<mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com>> Date: Friday, 1 March 2019 at 16:11 To: "Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)" <matthew.bocci@nokia.com<mailto:matthew.bocci@nokia.com>> Cc: Pankaj Garg <pankajg=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>>, "draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org>" <draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org>>, NVO3 <nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>> Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt Hi Matthew, I am happy to clarify and be more specific. However, despite your reading of [1] I think [1] clearly indicates the changes I expected as well as that these changes needs to be made. I believe the responsibility of not addressing an acknowledged issue is more on the side of people ignoring the issue then on the side of the one raising this issue. My impression is that this is the situation we are in. I agree that my initial comment saying "I am fine with the text if we do not find something better." might have been confusing and I apology for this. At the time of writing the initial comment I was not sure I was not missing something nor that the problem could not be solved here or somewhere else (in another section). My meaning behind those words were that I was open to the way the concerned could be addressed. However, - from my point of view - the text does not say the issue does not need to be solved which is the way it has been interpreted. In addition, I believe I have clarified this right away after the concern has been acknowledged and not addressed. As result, I do not think my comment could be reasonably read as the text is fine. Please fine the below the initial comment its response and the response to the response from [1]. """ <mglt> In case we have a option providing authentication, such option may affect the interpretation of the other options. s/interpretation/ndependance may not be better.... I think what we want to say is that option MUST be able to be processed in any order or in parallel. I am fine with the text if we do not find something better. </mglt> <Ilango> This is a good point, however we believe that this text captures the intent. </> <mglt2>The problem I have is that the current text prevents security options, so I guess some clarification should be brought to clarify the intent.</mglt2> """ If I had to suggest some text I would suggest the following - or something around the following lines. OLD o An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another. An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any other option. NEW o An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another. An option SHOULD NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any other option. There are rare cases were the parsing of one option affects the parsing or the interpretation of other option. Option related to security may fall into this category. Typically, if an option enables the authentication of another option and the authentication does not succeed, the authenticated option MUST NOT be processed. Other options may be designed in the future. NEW Security Consideration Geneve Overlay may be secured using by protecting the NVE-to-NVE communication using IPsec or DTLS. However, such mechanisms cannot be applied for deployments that include transit devices. Some deployment may not be able to secure the full communication using IPsec or DTLS between the NVEs. This could be motivated by the presence of transit devices or by a risk analysis that concludes that the Geneve packet be only partially protected - typically reduced to the Geneve Header information. In such cases Geneve specific mechanisms needs to be designed. For a complete threat analysis, a security analysis of Geneve or some guide lines to secure a Geneve overlay network, please refer to [draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirements] as well as [draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements]. For full disclosure I am a co-author of draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirement. However the reason for referring to these documents is motivated by the fact that I believe these analysis provide a better security analysis than the current (OLD) security consideration section. Yours, Daniel On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:03 AM Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB) <matthew.bocci@nokia.com<mailto:matthew.bocci@nokia.com>> wrote: Hi Daniel Thanks for reviewing the latest version. At this stage it would be helpful if you could be much more concrete and give specifics. I think that the main issue is whether the design of Geneve prevents future security extensions. However, in [1], you stated that you were comfortable with the text if nothing else could be found. What specifically do you want to change in the following, bearing in mind that there are already claimed implementations of Geneve: """ o An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another. An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any other option. """ Matthew From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com<mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com>> Date: Friday, 1 March 2019 at 03:06 To: Pankaj Garg <pankajg=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> Cc: "Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)" <matthew.bocci@nokia.com<mailto:matthew.bocci@nokia.com>>, NVO3 <nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>>, "draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org>" <draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org>> Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt Hi, I just briefly went through the document quickly and in my opinion, the document still faces some security issues. The current text (in my opinion) prevents any geneve security related options. Currently Geneve cannot be secured and this prevents future work to eventually secure Geneve. In my opinion the current text mandates Geneve to remain unsecure. Geneve security option that are willing to authenticate/encrypt a part of the Geneve Header will affect the parsing of the protected option and will affect the order in which option needs to be process. Typically a protected option (authenticated, encrypted) cannot or should not be processed before authenticated or decrypted. This has already been mentioned in [1], and the text needs in my opinion further clarifications. """ o An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another. An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any other option. """ As stated in [2] it remains unclear to me why this section is not referencing and leveraging on the security analysis [3-4] performed by two different independent teams.. My reading of the security consideration is that the message is that IPsec or TLS could be used to protect a geneve overlay network. This is - in my opinion- not correct as this does not consider the transit device. In addition, the security consideration only considers the case where the cloud provider and the overlay network provider are a single entity, which I believe oversimplifies the problem. The threat model seems to me very vague, so the current security consideration is limited to solving a problem that is not stated. My reading of the text indicates the tenant can handle by itself the confidentiality of its information without necessarily relying on the overlay service provider. This is not correct. Even when the tenant uses IPsec/TLS, it still leaks some information. The current text contradicts [3] section 6.2 and [4] section 5.1. My reading is that the text indicates that IPsec/DTLS could be used to protect the overlay service for both confidentiality and integrity. While this could be used in some deployment this is not compatible with transit devices. As such the generic statement is not correct. Section 6.4 indicates that transit device must be trusted which is incorrect. Instead the transit device with all nodes between the transit device and the NVE needs to be trusted. Overall the impression provided is that IPsec (or TLS) can be used by the service overlay provider, which is (in my opinion) not true. It is unclear to me how authentication of NVE peers differs from the authentication communication as the latest usually rely on the first. Maybe the section should insist on mutual authentication. Yours, Daniel [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/nvo3/RFFjYHAUUlMvOsYwRNtdOJOIk9o [2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/nvo3/e7YHFlqIuOwIJoL2ep7jyHIrSGw [3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements-07 [4] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirements-05 On Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 7:30 PM Pankaj Garg <pankajg=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote: I am not aware of any IP related to draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve which has not already been disclosed. Thanks Pankaj From: Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB) <matthew.bocci@nokia.com<mailto:matthew.bocci@nokia.com>> Sent: Tuesday, October 9, 2018 2:08 AM To: NVO3 <nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org>> Cc: draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve@ietf.org> Subject: Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt This email begins a two-week working group last call for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt. Please review the draft and post any comments to the NVO3 working group list. If you have read the latest version of the draft but have no comments and believe it is ready for publication as a standards track RFC, please also indicate so to the WG email list. We are also polling for knowledge of any undisclosed IPR that applies to this document, to ensure that IPR has been disclosed in compliance with IETF IPR rules (see RFCs 3979, 4879, 3669 and 5378 for more details). If you are listed as an Author or a Contributor of this document, please respond to this email and indicate whether or not you are aware of any relevant undisclosed IPR. The Document won't progress without answers from all the Authors and Contributors. Currently there are two IPR disclosures against this document. If you are not listed as an Author or a Contributor, then please explicitly respond only if you are aware of any IPR that has not yet been disclosed in conformance with IETF rules. This poll will run until Friday 26th October. Regards Matthew and Sam _______________________________________________ nvo3 mailing list nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nvo3 _______________________________________________ nvo3 mailing list nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nvo3 _______________________________________________ nvo3 mailing list nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nvo3 _______________________________________________ nvo3 mailing list nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nvo3 _______________________________________________ nvo3 mailing list nvo3@ietf.org<mailto:nvo3@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nvo3
- [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for d… Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… T. Sridhar
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… T. Sridhar
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jon Hudson
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Anoop Ghanwani
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Greg Mirsky
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Greg Mirsky
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Greg Mirsky
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Greg Mirsky
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Anoop Ghanwani
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Greg Mirsky
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Tal Mizrahi
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Chris Wright
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Dinesh Dutt
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Greg Mirsky
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Greg Mirsky
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Greg Mirsky
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Pankaj Garg
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Joel M. Halpern
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Joel Halpern Direct
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Ganga, Ilango S
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Joe Touch
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Joe Touch
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Joe Touch
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Daniel Migault
- Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll f… Jesse Gross