[nvo3] Review of draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-13

[Kathleen Moriarty <[e-mail]>]

Hello,

I just read through draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve, sorry I am out-of-cycle in the
review process, but it looks like it has not started IETF last call yet.  I
have what's really just a nit and request for a little more text.

Section 4.3.1

The value of the UDP checksum is overstated.  The text should note that
corruption is still possible as this is a checksum and not a hash with low
collision rates.  Corruption happens and goes undetected in normal
operations today.

The security considerations section does address the recommendation to use
IPsec, but making the connection on the UDP checksum being inadequate could
be helpful.

Reality:

The way this is written, I suspect there really are no plans to use IPsec
with GENEVE, are there?  The MUST statements around not altering traffic
can only be achieved with IPsec, so if the intent is really to enforce the
early MUST statements in the document, sooner mention of IPsec would be
good.  If this is more for detecting corruption (and not having that be
100% or close) that should be clear up front.

I'm just envisioning use cases where the virtual path is set differently to
the physical path for expected operations to route through desired security
functions, then an attacker alters checksums to avoid detection of these
changes.

Thanks and sorry for a late review!

-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen