Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt - transit devices

["Ganga, Ilango S" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Daniel,

We will try to explain the transit devices and example use cases again. Hopefully this clarifies your question.

>The transit devices seems to me problematic, but maybe I am not really
>catching what is their intent. I might be helpful if you could provide
>some behaviour the transit devices is expected to implement. Typically
>what are the use cases for these transit devices?
Transit devices exist in the underlay network, these are simply forwarding elements (e.g. switches, routers) that generally forward packets based on outer header information, there is nothing that stops such devices from reading or interpreting the contents.  At present, this works with any transport protocols (encapsulated or non-encapsulated), for example, IP, IP in IP, GRE, VXLAN, MPLS in UDP, GRE-in-UDP, etc.  For example, routers (transit device) may look at headers and/or inner payload for ECMP purposes or for statistics or logging purposes. If the packet is encrypted then such transit devices cannot look into the packets but would simply forward based on the outer headers and use information in outer headers for entropy. There is no interoperability issue between the endpoints. Geneve is no different.
Recognizing the fact that such a device will exist in the network, Geneve draft provides guidance on how to handle Geneve headers (if a device has the option to do so).  Geneve options are part of Geneve header, a transit device that is capable of interpreting Geneve headers may interpret an option or skip over the option to view the payload, etc.  If a transit device is either unable to, or does not need to interpret the Geneve header (which may or may not include options), it simply uses the outer header to forward the packet (outer IP/UDP). This is what the Geneve draft clarifies.
These guidelines reduce possible interoperability issues compared to if behavior was left undefined. For example, transit devices are not allowed to drop packets or fall back to a slow path on the basis of an unknown option. If this were to happen, it would hamper the introduction of new options.
Thanks,
Ilango


From: Daniel Migault [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 1:58 PM
To: Ganga, Ilango S <[e-mail]>
Cc: NVO3 <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt - transit devices

Hi,

I am looking at the version 12 and see how it address my concern,
regarding the transit devices and the compatibility with end to end
security. Could you please point out how the text address this concern ?

The basic scenario could be a Geneve deployment that processes options
O_i ( i in [1,,n]) in the NVE and that process option P_j [1, m] in the
Transit devices. While unprotected O_i and P_j are processed. Securing
the deployment with DTLS prevents options P_j to be processed. I am
unclear how the version 12 address this concern.

The transit devices seems to me problematic, but maybe I am not really
catching what is their intent. I might be helpful if you could provide
some behaviour the transit devices is expected to implement. Typically
what are the use cases for these transit devices?

<Response>
Transit devices exist in the underlay network, these are simply forwarding elements (e.g. switches, routers) that generally forwards packets based on outer header information, there is nothing that stops such devices from reading or interpreting the contents.  At present, this works with any transport protocols (encapsulated or non-encapsulated), for example, IP, IP in IP, GRE, VXLAN, MPLS in UDP, GRE-in-UDP, etc.  For example, routers may look at headers and/or inner payload for ECMP purposes or for statistics or logging purposes. If the packet is encrypted then such transit devices cannot look into the packets but would simply forward based on the outer headers and use information in outer headers for entropy. There is no interoperability issue between the endpoints. Geneve is no different.
Recognizing the fact that such a device will exist in the network, Geneve draft provides guidance on how to handle Geneve headers (if a device has the option to do so).  Geneve options are part of Geneve header, a transit device that is capable of interpreting Geneve headers may interpret an option or skip over the option to view the payload, etc.  If a transit device is either unable to, or don’t have the option to interpret the header or option, it simply uses the outer header to forward the packet (outer IP/UDP). This is what the Geneve draft clarifies.
These guidelines reduce possible interoperability issues compared to if behavior was left undefined. For example, transit devices are not allowed to drop packets or fall back to a slow path on the basis of an unknown option. If this were to happen, it would hamper the introduction of new options.
It might also be worth mentioning that anything that could be considered a middlebox is not a transit device but needs to be modeled as an endpoint. For example, if a middle box has a need to see an encrypted packet, then it has to implement tunnel endpoint functionality.
</end of response>

Yours,
Daniel


On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 7:20 PM Ganga, Ilango S <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Hi Daniel,

We posted a new version of the draft that we believe addresses your comment on options processing.
We have already provided clarification on the role transit devices as noted in this thread below.

Thanks,
Ilango


From: Daniel Migault [mailto:[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>]
Sent: Friday, March 8, 2019 6:51 PM
To: Ganga, Ilango S <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: NVO3 <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt - transit devices

Hi,

Thanks for the comment. Let me first recap my perception of the
discussion. My comment was that end-to-end security (IPsec, DTLS) does
not apply to Geneve with transit device. Your previous response was that
Geneve was an end-to-end protocol since transit device are optional. My
response was that an architecture that defines elements even optional
that interfere between the two end points contradicts the status of
end-to-end protocol. At that time my understanding was that the
specification was targeting an end-to-end protocol, with transit devices
with very limited capabilities. Thus I proposed to removed the transit
devices from the architecture. These would have been a great step toward a
end-to-end architecture. However, from the current response, it
seems that transit device play an important part in the architecture, and
we are moving backward from the end-to-end protocol. As
a result, there is - in my opinion to make a coherent choice to make
between Geneve architecture and the security associated. This is
currently very unclear and contradicting - at least to me reading of the
geneve specification and the responses I receive to my comments..

My understanding of your latest response - and please correct me
if I am wrong - is that transport protocols like IP,
IP in IP, GRE or VXLAN  among others are used to an architecture with
transit nodes.  These latter examples show that end-to-end security is
incompatible with Geneve and that security in Geneve MUST be handled
using options. In addition, these examples seems - up to my
understanding - to challenge the optional status of the transit device
as well as their ability to read-only does not always seems realistic.

Overall, my impression is that Genve is not an end-to-end protocol,
end-to-end security protocols such as DTLS or IPsec do not apply
realistically. The alternative approach of using option is also
compromised by the current specification of Geneve as well as by
security documents being opposed. Geneve seems mandated to be unsecured.


IP is the first protocol you cite. IP enables end-to-end security with
IPsec. However there are a few major difference between IPsec and secure
Geneve communications.
    1. - IPsec leave in clear the information that
need to be read in transit. This is not the case with Geneve over DTLS
or IPsec as even the Geneve Header is encrypted. If we want this
information to be accessible to transit device security must be handled
by geneve security option in order to leave the header in clear text.
    2. IPsec/ESP versus IPsec/AH clearly shows that transit elements do not
restrict from reading the options. As a result, the transit device are
likely to evolve and become more active in the future. As a result, the
security MUST consider this in early stage and I do not see that met.


Yours,
Daniel

On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 9:33 PM Ganga, Ilango S <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Hi Daniel,

Please see my responses inline below.

Thanks,
Ilango


From: nvo3 [mailto:[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>] On Behalf Of Daniel Migault
Sent: Monday, March 4, 2019 9:15 AM
To: Ganga, Ilango S <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt

Hi Ilango,

Thanks for the response. Please see a concrete example to illustrate my concern
for comment 1. For comment 2, it really helped you indicated that Geneve is expected
to be an end-to-end protocol. This will help me update the security requirement
document. However, the current Geneve specification with transit devices seems -
at least to me - to raise an architecture concern as raised in [1].

-- comment 1:

Thanks for the feed back. I understand the purpose of keeping option
independent one from each other, and favour this is strongly recommended.
However, I am not convinced this applies always. More specifically, in a
context of security, the purpose of a security option may be related to
another option. Typically, a security option providing authentication or
encryption is potentially authenticating/encryption another option or
other information contained in the header.

The typical scenario I have in mind would be an authentication option A
authenticating option O. There will clearly some dependencies between A
and O as O could only be used if A has been primarily been validated.
The current statement "SHOULD NOT be dependent" enables this. However, I
have concerns regarding the statement "MUST NOT affect the parsing or
interpretation". In fact, the output of A, will determine if O should be
dropped or processed normally. In case A shows O is not appropriately
authenticated, O might be rejected based on its C value. The ambiguity I
see is that A can be understood as affecting the parsing and
interpretation of O or as a pre-processing operation before parsing or
interpretation of O.

I think, the text needs further clarifications to remove such ambiguity.
Changing MUST NOT by SHOULD NOT was of course only one proposition and
this could be also addressed otherwise. It might be better, I agree, to
explicitly mention that some options may provide condition on the
parsing of the options. This would leave the parsing of the options unchanged.

<Ilango>
If I understand your example correctly, you want to have one option authenticate the contents of another option and if that authentication fails, drop the option. This would not drop the entire packet unless that option is critical. Can you give a use case for this? This seems unusual and not something that is supported by other security protocols such as IPsec or TLS to the best of our knowledge.

I believe a more common outcome of a failed authentication is that the entire packet would be dropped. As previously noted, the current text does not preclude this. It seems like going beyond this would result in significant complexity, both for processing options in this specific case as well as the possibility of introducing ambiguity in how other options might be defined or processed as an unintended consequence. Without a strong use case, this does not seem desirable.
</>

-- comment 2:

Thanks for the response that clarifies a bit my understanding of the
transit devices.. I believe the issue I have is related to the transit
devices which I do not see, unless I am wrong, meeting the requirements
for being OPTIONAL and that seems - at least to me - contradicting the
status of end-to-end protocol. As suggested in [1], transit devices seem to raise
architectural concerns that is not needed.

You are correct that the text is clear that transit devices are
OPTIONAL. However, my understanding of OPTIONAL from 2119 is that there
are two sides of it. One is that a vendor may implement it or not, but
the other side is that interoperability with other implementations are
not affected. In this case, two Geneve endpoints using TLS or IPsec will
not be able to interoperate with an implementation based on transit
devices (unless the process being performed by the transit devices is
also performed by the NVE). In that sense, I believe OPTIONAL statement
is not appropriated here.

An implementation with transit devices seems to prevent the
interoperability of with an implementation where  options are treated
by the NVE over a secure channel. If we suppose that NVE and
transit devices support the same options, then transit devices are not
necessary and could be removed from the specification. If options
supported by transit devices are different from those supported by
the NVE, interoperability will not be achieved. Transit device will not be
able to process the options, resulting in options will be ignored (while
being supported by the implementation).. In addition, if the options
are critical, the NVE is likely to drop the packet as it does not support
the option.

In addition, I have some hard time to understand the end-to-end model
with a transit device even optional. I believe that end-to-end protocol
is a good path, though. However, my understanding of end-to-end protocol
is that they should only involve two end points. I see the NVE as end
points but the optional transit device does not seems to be one of
these. However, to help me understand better this, as it seems Geneve is
similar to other end-to-end protocol, maybe you could provide similar
end-to-end protocol that involves a transit devices or something similar.

I also have another clarification regarding transit device. I see these
transit devices as adding a lot of complexity to the end-to-end model
with little benefits. Typically, as far as I understand, they can only
read an option. I am thus wondering whether we should not be better off
removing them from the specification. This would end up with a clear
end-to-end model. Reversely, I do not see anything preventing a vendor
to implement them at least for unsecure deployments. Removing them
from the specification would leave the transit devices as implementation
specific. What are actually the benefits of the transit devices that would
justify them to be part of the specification?

<Ilango>
Transit devices exists in the underlay network, these are simply forwarding elements (e.g. switches, routers) that generally forwards packets based on outer header information, there is nothing that stops such devices from reading the contents if the data is in the clear.  This works with any transport protocols like IP, IP in IP, GRE, VXLAN, etc.  For example, routers may look at headers and/or inner payload for ECMP purposes or for statistics or logging purposes. If the packet is encrypted then such transit devices cannot look into the packets but would simply forward based on the outer headers and use information in outer headers for entropy. There is no interoperability issue between the endpoints. Geneve is no different.

Recognizing the fact that such a device is anyway going to exist in the network, Geneve draft provides guidance on how to handle Geneve headers (if a device has the option to do so).  Geneve options are part of Geneve header, a transit device that is capable of interpreting Geneve headers may interpret an option or skip over the option to view the payload, etc.  If a transit device is not able interpret the header or option, it has to simply use the outer header to forward the packet (outer IP/UDP). This is what the Geneve draft clarifies.

These guidelines reduce possible interoperability issues compared to if behavior was left undefined. For example, transit devices are not allowed to drop packets or fall back to a slow path on the basis of an unknown option. If this were to happen, it would hamper the introduction of new options. It might also be worth mentioning that anything that could be considered a middlebox is not a transit device but needs to be modeled as an endpoint and so Geneve really should be viewed as a tunnel endpoint-to-endpoint protocol.
<end>


[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/nvo3/ekLofhq8erRLE_Msuk8N_SCdhcs


Yours,
Daniel

On Sat, Mar 2, 2019 at 8:18 PM Ganga, Ilango S <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Hi Daniel,

Let us be specific. I see that you have two comments on the latest draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-09.  Please see below for responses to your comments.

Comment 1:
OLD
   o  An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the
      packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another.
      An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any
      other option.

NEW

   o  An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the
      packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another.
      An option SHOULD NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any
      other option.

<Ilango>
Architecturally Geneve options can be processed independent of one another. The second statement clearly states that parsing or interpretation of one option must not affect the other.  This is a reasonable constraint to avoid nested dependencies. Options can be designed to work with the requirements specified in Geneve.

Let us take specific examples:
We could think of a design of a Header Integrity check option (related to your example). In this case if the header integrity check fails, as a result the entire header is invalid and hence the most likely outcome of a failed check is that the packet being dropped (including any options in that packet whether parsed/interpreted or not). The current text does not preclude the packet being dropped as result of failure.

It is possible to design options, including any security options, with these constraints.  We don’t see a reason to change this requirement that may have unintended consequences.

Comment 2:

NEW
Security Consideration

Geneve Overlay may be secured using by protecting the NVE-to-NVE
communication using IPsec or DTLS. However, such mechanisms cannot be
applied for deployments that include transit devices..

Some deployment may not be able to secure the full communication using
IPsec or DTLS between the NVEs. This could be motivated by the presence
of transit devices or by a risk analysis that concludes that the Geneve
packet be only partially protected - typically reduced to the Geneve
Header information. In such cases Geneve specific mechanisms needs to be
designed.

<Ilango> The challenge is, you are asking to impose requirements that is not supported by Geneve architecture. Geneve has an optional feature where transit devices may be able to interpret Geneve options. However this is not a requirement for Geneve operation between tunnel end point to tunnel end point. We have tried make this very clear by adding clarifying text during the last two revisions. If the Geneve packet is in the clear then transit devices may be able to view the Genve header, options, and the payload. However if the packet is encrypted then transit devices cannot view the packet contents. This is consistent with other transport protocols encrypting the packets. So we don’t see a reason why Geneve should be different.

Geneve is an end to end protocol between tunnel endpoints and the NVEs decide to secure (encrypt) the packets between tunnel endpoints. If a middle box has a need to see an encrypted packet, then it has to implement tunnel endpoint functionality.

We already have text in 6.4 security consideration section that provides clear guidance to the operators.

So we don’t see a good reason to add the suggested text above.

For a complete threat analysis, a security analysis of Geneve or some
guide lines to secure a Geneve overlay network, please refer to
[draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirements] as well as
[draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements].

<Ilango>
The security requirements document  makes certain assumptions that is unsupported by Geneve architecture. We have tried to clarify this multiple times, however you have still maintained this in the requirements document. So this needs to be addressed. Also the document is not yet adopted by the working group.

Moreover, Geneve security consideration section has been significantly enhanced to provide guidance to operators and to address the comments. So both documents can progress independently.

Thanks,
Ilango


From: Daniel Migault [mailto:[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>]
Sent: Saturday, March 2, 2019 8:49 AM
To: Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB) <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>; Pankaj Garg <pankajg=[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; NVO3 <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt

Hi Matt,


You are correct, this is at least not an regular process to have a
standard track document being updated by an informational. I do not see
either any requirements for having a WG status to become a reference,
but that is something we could confirm with the RFC-editor.

Back to the initial suggestion, I also believe the difficulties of updating
the Geneve specifications are far less complex than updating the
implementation, and for that specific reason, it would be good we have a
consensus on the security analyse.

I agree that WG draft would be better, and RFC would be even better as
we have seen WG document being stalled. I am confident we can make this
happen or at least I do not see major issues.

Yours,
Daniel


On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 11:51 AM Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB) <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
WG, Daniel,

Apologies but I mis-spoke on the suggestion for the security requirements to act as an update to the encapsulation RFC in future. This would be difficult to do as it is informational.

Nonetheless I think we should only be referencing a WG draft (at a minimum) here.

Matthew



From: Dacheng Zhang <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> on behalf of "Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Friday, 1 March 2019 at 16:24
To: Daniel Migault <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: "[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, Pankaj Garg <pankajg=[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, NVO3 <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt

Daniel

From a procedural perspective, referring to your draft creates a dependency and that draft has not yet been adopted by the WG. The old Security requirements framework expired a couple of years ago and does not seem to be being progressed.
Maybe a better approach to allow progress, as long as the WG can agree to your text (if needed) to satisfy the concern that future security mechanisms can be used, and that the evolving threat analysis is understood by implementers and users of Geneve, would be to mark the Geneve security requirements as an update to the geneve encapsulation RFC when it is published.

Matthew

From: Daniel Migault <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Friday, 1 March 2019 at 16:11
To: "Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: Pankaj Garg <pankajg=[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, "[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, NVO3 <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt

Hi Matthew,

I am happy to clarify and be more specific. However, despite your
reading of [1] I think [1] clearly indicates the changes I expected as
well as that these changes needs to be made.

I believe the responsibility of not addressing an acknowledged issue is
more on the side of people ignoring the issue  then on the side of the
one raising this issue. My impression is that this is the situation we
are in.

I agree that my initial comment saying "I am fine with the text if we do
not find something better." might have been confusing and I apology for
this. At the time of writing the initial comment I was not sure I was
not missing something nor that the problem could not be solved here or
somewhere else (in another section). My meaning behind those words were
that I was open to the way the concerned could be addressed. However, -
from my point of view - the text does not say the issue does not need to
be solved which is the way it has been interpreted. In addition, I
believe I have clarified this right away after the concern has been
acknowledged and not addressed. As result, I do not think my comment
could be reasonably read as the text is fine.

Please fine the below the initial comment its response and the response
to the response from [1].

"""
<mglt> In case we have a option providing authentication, such option
may affect the interpretation of the other options.
s/interpretation/ndependance may not be better.... I think what we want
to say is that option MUST be able to be processed in any order or in
parallel.  I am fine with the text if we do not find something better.
</mglt>

<Ilango> This is a good point, however we believe that this text
captures the intent.  </>

<mglt2>The problem I have is that the current text prevents security
options, so I guess some clarification should be brought to clarify the
intent.</mglt2>
"""

If I had to suggest some text I would suggest the following - or
something around the following lines.


OLD
   o  An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the
      packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another.
      An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any
      other option.

NEW

   o  An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the
      packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another.
      An option SHOULD NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any
      other option.

There are rare cases were the parsing of one option affects the parsing
or the interpretation of other option. Option related to security may
fall into this category. Typically, if an option enables the
authentication of another option and the authentication does not
succeed, the authenticated option MUST NOT be processed. Other options
may be designed in the future.

NEW
Security Consideration

Geneve Overlay may be secured using by protecting the NVE-to-NVE
communication using IPsec or DTLS. However, such mechanisms cannot be
applied for deployments that include transit devices.

Some deployment may not be able to secure the full communication using
IPsec or DTLS between the NVEs. This could be motivated by the presence
of transit devices or by a risk analysis that concludes that the Geneve
packet be only partially protected - typically reduced to the Geneve
Header information. In such cases Geneve specific mechanisms needs to be
designed.

For a complete threat analysis, a security analysis of Geneve or some
guide lines to secure a Geneve overlay network, please refer to
[draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirements] as well as
[draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements].

For full disclosure I am a co-author of
draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirement. However the reason for
referring to these documents is motivated by the fact that I believe
these analysis provide a better security analysis than the current (OLD)
security consideration section.

Yours,
Daniel


On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 6:03 AM Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB) <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Hi Daniel

Thanks for reviewing the latest version. At this stage it would be helpful if you could be much more concrete and give specifics.

I think that the main issue is whether the design of Geneve prevents future security extensions.

However, in [1], you stated that you were comfortable with the text if nothing else could be found.

What specifically do you want to change in the following, bearing in mind that there are already claimed implementations of Geneve:
"""
   o  An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the
      packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another.
      An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any
      other option.
"""


Matthew


From: Daniel Migault <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Date: Friday, 1 March 2019 at 03:06
To: Pankaj Garg <pankajg=[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: "Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB)" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, NVO3 <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>, "[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [nvo3] Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt

Hi,

I just briefly went through the document quickly and in my opinion, the document still faces some security issues.

The current text (in my opinion) prevents any geneve security related
options. Currently Geneve cannot be secured and this prevents future
work to eventually secure Geneve. In my opinion the current text
mandates Geneve to remain unsecure.

Geneve security option that are willing to authenticate/encrypt a part
of the Geneve Header will affect the parsing of the protected option and
will affect the order in which option needs to be process. Typically a
protected option (authenticated, encrypted) cannot or should not be
processed before authenticated or decrypted.

This has already been mentioned in [1], and the text needs in my opinion
further clarifications.

"""
   o  An option SHOULD NOT be dependent upon any other option in the
      packet, i.e., options can be processed independent of one another.
      An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any
      other option.
"""



As stated in [2] it remains unclear to me why this section is not
referencing and leveraging on the security analysis [3-4] performed by
two different independent teams..

My reading of the security consideration is that the message is that
IPsec or TLS could be used to protect a geneve overlay network. This is
- in my opinion- not correct as this does not consider the transit
device. In addition, the security consideration only considers the case
where the cloud provider and the overlay network provider are a single
entity, which I believe oversimplifies the problem.

The threat model seems to me very vague, so the current security
consideration is limited to solving a problem that is not stated.

My reading of the text indicates the tenant can handle by itself the
confidentiality of its information without necessarily relying on the
overlay service provider. This is not correct. Even when the tenant uses
IPsec/TLS, it still leaks some information. The current text contradicts
[3] section 6.2 and [4] section 5.1.

My reading is that the text indicates that IPsec/DTLS could be used to
protect the overlay service for both confidentiality and integrity.
While this could be used in some deployment this is not compatible with
transit devices. As such the generic statement is not correct. Section
6.4 indicates that transit device must be trusted which is incorrect.
Instead the transit device with all nodes between the transit device and
the NVE needs to be trusted.  Overall the impression provided is that
IPsec (or TLS) can be used by the service overlay provider, which is (in
my opinion) not true.

It is unclear to me how authentication of NVE peers differs from the
authentication communication as the latest usually rely on the first.
Maybe the section should insist on mutual authentication.

Yours,
Daniel


[1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/nvo3/RFFjYHAUUlMvOsYwRNtdOJOIk9o
[2] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/nvo3/e7YHFlqIuOwIJoL2ep7jyHIrSGw
[3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements-07
[4] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-nvo3-geneve-security-requirements-05





On Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 7:30 PM Pankaj Garg <pankajg=[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
I am not aware of any IP related to draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve which has not already been disclosed.

Thanks
Pankaj

From: Bocci, Matthew (Nokia - GB) <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Sent: Tuesday, October 9, 2018 2:08 AM
To: NVO3 <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
Subject: Working Group Last Call and IPR Poll for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt

This email begins a two-week working group last call for draft-ietf-nvo3-geneve-08.txt.

Please review the draft and post any comments to the NVO3 working group list. If you have read the latest version of the draft but have no comments and believe it is ready for publication as a standards track RFC, please also indicate so to the WG email list.

We are also polling for knowledge of any undisclosed IPR that applies to this document, to ensure that IPR has been disclosed in compliance with IETF IPR rules (see RFCs 3979, 4879, 3669 and 5378 for more details).
If you are listed as an Author or a Contributor of this document, please respond to this email and indicate whether or not you are aware of any relevant undisclosed IPR. The Document won't progress without answers from all the Authors and Contributors.

Currently there are two IPR disclosures against this document.

If you are not listed as an Author or a Contributor, then please explicitly respond only if you are aware of any IPR that has not yet been disclosed in conformance with IETF rules.

This poll will run until Friday 26th October.

Regards

Matthew and Sam
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