Re: [OAUTH-WG] PAR and client metadata

[Sascha Preibisch <[e-mail]>]

I am also in favour of such metadata.

I just implemented the draft and I used a client, which had multiple
redirect_uris, for testing purposes. That in mind, one of my thoughts
is that it could also be an advantage to not only bind a client to use
PAR but in combination with a specific redirect_uri only. This may be
a implementation detail of the AS, just wanted to mention it.

Regards,
Sascha

On Thu, 16 Apr 2020 at 01:16, Filip Skokan <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> I would support defining a client level property. I would also support an AS discovery property for an AS-wide policy that is signalled to all clients (and maybe that one would be enough).
>
> FWIW (and this touches my earlier responses about the dpop scheme) defining metadata (both AS and Client) is beneficial not only for runtime (DCR, discovery) but in general supports developers using these specs, when they read about a possible behaviour in the document and there's a mentioned metadata property, they know what to look for in readmes, API documentation, UI etc. It saves time, theirs, and mine when i develop those behaviour toggles - i don't have to start mixing configuration objects so far composed entirely of IANA registered properties with proprietary ones, i don't need to come up with property names (and we know what a PITA that is) and it also saves time in the long run because it's less likely someone will open an issue about it.
>
> Best,
> Filip
>
>
> On Tue, 14 Apr 2020 at 22:09, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Using PAR can facilitate improved security by giving clients a (relatively) simple means for sending a confidential, integrity protected, and (for confidential clients anyway) authenticated authorization request.
>>
>> It seems like some of that improved security could be undermined by a malicious actor somehow getting a user to navigate to a URL of a regular old parameterized authorization request. One variation of the Mix-Up Attack does this https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15#section-4.4.1 for example and email, social media, online forums, etc., are other ways a user might be tricked into following a maliciously crafted link.
>>
>> Following from that it seems logical that an authorization server might want to restrict some clients from sending a regular parameterized authorization request and instead require use of the PAR endpoint to initiate an authorization request. Something like this could, of course, be implemented as custom policy or configuration in any AS. But I'm thinking it might be common enough to warrant adding a client metadata parameter to the PAR draft specifically for it. The metadata (and registered extensions) defined by Dynamic Client Registration [RFC7591] has come to imply a general data model and expected associated behaviors for clients that is useful for authorization server implementations, even when the Dynamic Client Registration Protocol isn't directly in play. This particular situation seems like a good potential candidate for a new such client metadata parameter that would indicate that the given client can only use a request_uri value obtained from the PAR endpoint to initiate an authorization request. And that a regular old fashioned authorization request from the given client would result in an error.
>>
>> Do the folks of this fine WG think something like this would be a worthwhile addition to the PAR draft?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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