Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object

[Filip Skokan <[e-mail]>]

Yes, that sounds good to me.

Best,
Filip


On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 at 03:18, Nat Sakimura <[e-mail]> wrote:

> So, where should we take it to?
> Just add back client_id as it used to be?
>
> On Fri, Jan 24, 2020 at 6:55 AM John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>> From: John Bradley <[e-mail]>
>> Date: Sat, Jan 18, 2020, 9:31 PM
>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [EXTERNAL] Re: JWT Secured Authorization Request
>> (JAR) vs OIDC request object
>> To: Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>
>>
>>
>> If you put the iss in the JWE header it is integrity protected, as JWE
>> only supports AAD encryption algs.
>>
>> It is more of a problem when the client is sending a requestURI in that
>> case having the clientID in the GET to the Authorization endpoint is useful.
>>
>> I think there is a argument for explicitly allowing the clientID as long
>> as it exactly matches the clientID in the JAR.
>>
>> John B.
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 17, 2020 at 11:53 PM Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Jan 17, 2020 at 08:44:18AM -0500, Justin Richer wrote:
>>> > I don’t agree with this stance from a security or implementation
>>> perspective.
>>> >
>>> > If there’s a clear order of precedence for the information, it’s not
>>> particularly problematic. Everything inside the request object is to be
>>> taken over things outside the request object. We have the exact same
>>> semantics and process with dynamic registration, where the software
>>> statement is carried alongside plain JSON claims, and the two are mixed
>>> with a very simple algorithm:
>>> >
>>> >  - If a field is inside the signed payload, use that value and ignore
>>> any copy of it on the outside
>>> >  - If a field is not inside the signed payload and is outside the
>>> signed payload, use the outside value
>>> >
>>> > Can someone please point out a concrete security issue with this
>>> algorithm? This is the extent of the “merge” semantics that we need here,
>>> and it would solve not only the ability to use this for use cases that call
>>> for a more static request object (perhaps signed by a third party and not
>>> the client) along side the plain parameters that can vary, but also the
>>> backwards compatibility issue that’s been discussed. With this algorithm in
>>> place, you could have OIDC clients actually be compliant with the spec,
>>> since OIDC requires replication of the values inside the request object on
>>> the outside with exact matches. An OIDC server wouldn’t be fully compliant
>>> with the new spec since it would reject some compliant JAR requests that
>>> are missing the external parameters, but that’s fairly easy logic to add on
>>> the OIDC side. And in that case you get a matrix of compatibility like:
>>>
>>> I agree that the merge algorithm is simple and fairly straightforward to
>>> implement.  But, as Joseph has been alluding, it's only simple if you've
>>> already made the decision to use all the parameters, both from inside and
>>> from outside the signed payload.  The security risk lies about having to
>>> make the trust decision twice, more than the mundane details of actually
>>> doing the merge.  (Though there is still some latent risk, given that
>>> we've
>>> seen some really crazy quality of implementation out there.)
>>>
>>> It's certainly *possible* that things end up fine in many well-deliniated
>>> cases where merging can be used.  But it's more complicated to reason
>>> about, and I don't remmber seeing much previous discussion about the
>>> specifics of the double trust decision.
>>>
>>> -Ben
>>>
>>> >
>>> >               JAR Server | OIDC Server  |
>>> > ------------+------------+--------------+
>>> > JAR Client  |     YES    |      NO      |
>>> > OIDC Client |     YES    |     YES      |
>>> >
>>> > Breaking one out of the four possible combinations in a very
>>> predictable way is, I think, the best way to handle backwards compatibility
>>> here.
>>> >
>>> > But between this issue and JAR’s problematic call for the value of a
>>> request_uri to always be a JWT and be fetchable by the AS (neither of which
>>> are true in the case of PAR) makes me think we need to pull this back and
>>> rework those things, in a push back to the IESG’s comments.
>>> >
>>> >  — Justin
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > > On Jan 16, 2020, at 7:38 PM, Joseph Heenan <[e-mail]>
>>> wrote:
>>> > >
>>> > > I agree with this, particularly the security concerns of merging. If
>>> we merge, we can much guarantee there will eventually be a security issue
>>> where an attacker is able to gain an advantage by adding a parameter to the
>>> url query (which the server would then happily process if that parameter
>>> isn’t found inside the request object). Ruling out that case makes security
>>> analysis (particularly when creating new OAuth2 parameters) significantly
>>> simpler.
>>> > >
>>> > > Putting the iss in the JWE header and having the client_id
>>> duplicated outside the request object seem to address all the concerns I’ve
>>> seen raised.
>>> > >
>>> > > (It seems like it may be unnecessary to have the client_id
>>> duplicated outside if the request_uri is a PAR one though.)
>>> > >
>>> > > Joseph
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > >> On 16 Jan 2020, at 22:40, John Bradley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> > >>
>>> > >> I agree with the IESG reasoning that merging is problimatic.  Once
>>> we
>>> > >> allow that given a unknown list of possible paramaters with diffrent
>>> > >> security properties it would be quite difficult to specify safely.
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Query paramaters can still be sent outside the JAR, but if they are
>>> in
>>> > >> the OAuth registry the AS MUST ignore them.
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Puting the iss in the JWE headder addresses the encryption issue
>>> without
>>> > >> merging.
>>> > >>
>>> > >> I understand that some existing servers have dependencys on getting
>>> the
>>> > >> clientID as a query paramater.
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Is that the only paramater that people have a issue with as oposed
>>> to a
>>> > >> nice to have?
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Would allowing the AS to not ignore the clientID as a query
>>> paramater as
>>> > >> long as it matches the one inside the JAR, basicly the same as
>>> Connect
>>> > >> request object but for just the one paramater make life easier for
>>> the
>>> > >> servers?
>>> > >>
>>> > >> I am not promising a change but gathering info before proposing
>>> something.
>>> > >>
>>> > >> John B.
>>> > >>
>>> > >>
>>> > >> On 1/16/2020 1:53 AM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>>> > >>> On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 11:02:33PM +0200, Vladimir Dzhuvinov wrote:
>>> > >>>> On 14/01/2020 19:20, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
>>> > >>>>> Well, embedding a client_id claim in the JWE header in order to
>>> > >>>>> achieve "request parameters outside the request object should
>>> not be
>>> > >>>>> referred to" is like "putting the cart before the horse". Why do
>>> we
>>> > >>>>> have to avoid using the traditional client_id request parameter
>>> so
>>> > >>>>> stubbornly?
>>> > >>>>>
>>> > >>>>> The last paragraph of Section 3.2.1
>>> > >>>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1> of RFC 6749
>>> says
>>> > >>>>> as follows.
>>> > >>>>>
>>> > >>>>>   /A client MAY use the "client_id" request parameter to identify
>>> > >>>>>   itself when sending requests to the token endpoint.  In the
>>> > >>>>>   "authorization_code" "grant_type" request to the token
>>> endpoint,
>>> > >>>>>   *an unauthenticated client MUST send its "client_id" to prevent
>>> > >>>>>   itself from inadvertently accepting a code intended for a
>>> client
>>> > >>>>>   with a different "client_id".*  This protects the client from
>>> > >>>>>   substitution of the authentication code.  (It provides no
>>> > >>>>>   additional security for the protected resource.)/
>>> > >>>>>
>>> > >>>>>
>>> > >>>>> If the same reasoning applies, a client_id must always be sent
>>> with
>>> > >>>>> request / request_uri because client authentication is not
>>> performed
>>> > >>>>> at the authorization endpoint. In other words, */an
>>> unauthenticated
>>> > >>>>> client (every client is unauthenticated at the authorization
>>> endpoint)
>>> > >>>>> MUST send its "client_id" to prevent itself from inadvertently
>>> > >>>>> accepting a request object for a client with a different
>>> "client_id"./*
>>> > >>>>>
>>> > >>>> Identifying the client in JAR request_uri requests can be really
>>> useful
>>> > >>>> so that an AS which requires request_uri registration to prevent
>>> DDoS
>>> > >>>> attacks and other checks can do those without having to index all
>>> > >>>> request_uris individually. I mentioned this before.
>>> > >>>>
>>> > >>>> I really wonder what the reasoning of the IESG reviewers was to
>>> insist
>>> > >>>> on no params outside the JAR JWT / request_uri.
>>> > >>>>
>>> > >>>> I'm beginning to realise this step of the review process isn't
>>> > >>>> particularly transparent to WG members.
>>> > >>> Could you expand on that a bit more?  My understanding is that the
>>> IESG
>>> > >>> ballot mail gets copied to the WG precisely so that there is
>>> transparency,
>>> > >>> e.g., the thread starting at
>>> > >>>
>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/lkOhwiDj_hCI55BQRdiR9R0JwgI
>>> > >>> Which admittely is from almost three years ago, but that's the
>>> earliest
>>> > >>> that I found that could be seen as the source of this behavior.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> -Ben
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> P.S. some other discussion at
>>> > >>>
>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/-tUrNY1X9eI_tQGI8T-IGx4xHy8
>>> and
>>> > >>>
>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/Uke1nxRlgx62EJLevZgpWCz_UwY
>>> and
>>> > >>> so on.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> _______________________________________________
>>> > >>> OAuth mailing list
>>> > >>> [e-mail]
>>> > >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>> > >>
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>
>
> --
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/
> @_nat_en
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