Re: [OAUTH-WG] Token Transfer Protocol

Niklas Neumann <niklas.neumann@cs.uni-goettingen.de> Thu, 21 October 2010 09:06 UTC

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Date: Thu, 21 Oct 2010 11:07:48 +0200
From: Niklas Neumann <niklas.neumann@cs.uni-goettingen.de>
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To: George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com>
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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Token Transfer Protocol
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Yes the server is supposed to verify the Reflection-Key. Regarding any 
middleboxes, the Reflection-Key from the server's perspective is a 
somewhat static value and therefore can be configured on an application 
level rather than being determined dynamically.
Specifically, if load-balancers or off-loaders are used, the mechanism 
still works if the application has been configured to check the 
Reflection-Key against a list of valid source IP/port pairs or public 
certificate fingerprints that are externally or statically supplied 
rather than determining the values itself. I hope this clear things up.

Best regards
   Niklas


On 10/19/2010 08:15 PM, George Fletcher wrote:
>   Question on the Reflection-Key parameter when it is generated from the
> source IP and port pair. Is the server receiving the request supposed to
> verify that the data in the Reflection-Key matches the data of the
> inbound connection? If so, then I think NAT'ing firewalls, proxies and
> network SSL off-loaders (e.g. netscalers) will break the security mechanism.
>
> Thanks,
> George
>
> On 10/18/10 12:03 PM, Niklas Neumann wrote:
>> Hello everybody,
>>
>> I am currently working on a projected related to authentication and
>> secure token transfer between multiple devices. As such we are
>> employing a simple protocol that handles token transfers independent
>> of the actual type of token. We have adapted the protocol to be used
>> with OAuth tokens and submitted it as an Internet Draft:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-neumann-oauth-token-transfer
>>
>> I was wondering if there is interest in employing such a protocol in
>> cases where the HTTP redirection schemes of OAuth are not available or
>> not working well (e.g. desktop applications without access to a user
>> agent or authentication from a different device/application than the
>> one accessing the consumer).
>>
>> Compared to other proposals such as
>> draft-dehora-farrell-oauth-accesstoken-creds the STTP is more
>> heavyweight but in turn it also has more options. With regards to
>> authentication we didn't use SASL for complexity reasons in our work
>> initialy but I don't see any reason not to include it if this is
>> deemed more appropriate.
>>
>> The work that the draft is based on is still ongoing. Please
>> understand the draft as no more than a discussion proposal on how
>> OAuth could be opened to non-web-based environments and scenarios that
>> involve multiple devices without overloading the OAuth specification
>> itself. I am happy to further improve the draft if you think this
>> might be a viable option.
>>
>> Best regards
>> Niklas
>>
>



-- 
Niklas Neumann - University of Goettingen, Institute of Computer Science
http://user.informatik.uni-goettingen.de/~nneuman1/
Tel: +49 551 39-172053