[OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers
Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Mon, 22 July 2024 23:25 UTC
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2024 16:24:57 -0700
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To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers
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On Mon, Jul 22, 2024, 3:30 PM John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote: > I agree that single-use proof keys and batch issuance are a must. > > Issuer verifier collusion is admittedly a problem. To address that we do > need different cryptographic methods. > > MDOC also has the same issue. > > We should document the risk, but short of stopping EUID and mobile > driver's license deployment, we have limited options. > The problem only appears when the drivers license or EUID is used in a way that makes the user think their data is private. You don't have to support UX that lies to the user. > Hopefully, we can make quick progress on JWP. > > John B. > > On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 2:14 PM Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Dear Oauth, >> >> I'm disappointed to see SD-JWT work continue with inadequate privacy >> considerations. The fact is an Issuer can link any showings to >> issuance of the credential. This is not foregrounded sufficiently in >> privacy considerations, nor do we discuss how to ensure users are >> aware. We really need to use more RFC 2119 language and highlight >> these issues. Section 11.1 about local storage which has never been an >> IETF concern before is far more prescriptive than 11.4, and that's not >> a good thing. To be clear, the threat model must include an issuer >> that is a government issuing credentials that if used to verify age on >> certain websites or via a digital wallet on site, and learned about by >> the issuer who may have access to data from the site, will result in >> imprisonment or execution. This is not a hypothetical scenario. >> >> Users and UX designers will have intuitions that do not match the >> reality and that result in bad decisions being made. That's on us. A >> driver's license doesn't leave a trace of where you showed it, but the >> SD-JWT does. >> >> At a minimum I think we mandate batch issuance and one time usage >> using RFC 2119 language. We need to say in clear, unambiguous English >> that this mechanism enables an issuer to connect every presentation of >> a credential to the issuance. >> >> Sincerely, >> Watson Ladd >> >> -- >> Astra mortemque praestare gradatim >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list -- oauth@ietf.org >> To unsubscribe send an email to oauth-leave@ietf.org >> >
- [OAUTH-WG] We cannot trust Issuers Watson Ladd
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers John Bradley
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Watson Ladd
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Richard Barnes
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Michael Prorock
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Dick Hardt
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Wayne Chang
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Leif Johansson
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Wayne Chang
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Watson Ladd
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Nat Sakimura
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Brian Campbell
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Tom Jones
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Watson Ladd
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Brian Campbell
- [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers Watson Ladd