Re: [OAUTH-WG] Token Mediating and session Information Backend For Frontend (TMI BFF)

[Neil Madden <[e-mail]>]

> On 15 Feb 2021, at 10:26, Philippe De Ryck <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>>> On 15 Feb 2021, at 11:14, Neil Madden <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 15 Feb 2021, at 08:32, Philippe De Ryck <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>> [...]
>>> 
>>> Compared to using a worker for handling RTs, I believe the TMI-BFF only adds a single security benefit: an attacker is no longer able to run a silent flow to obtain a fresh set of tokens (since the client is now a confidential client). 
>> 
>> But they can just call the bff-token endpoint to do the same. If there is a security advantage, IMO it is as a defence in depth against open redirects, unicode normalisation attacks (ie not validating the redirect_uri correctly at the AS), etc. 
> 
> A Web Worker and the TMI-BFF both encapsulate the RT and only expose the (short-lived) AT.

I don’t think this distinction matters at all from a security point of view. It’s the AT that attackers are after - why bother with a RT if I can just call the bff-token endpoint to get a new AT every time?

> 
> With the worker-based approach, the client is a public client that completes the code exchange without authentication. This allows an attacker to run an independent silent flow in an iframe within the legitimate application. This flow relies on the existing cookie-based session with the AS to obtain an AT and RT, independent of the tokens of the client application. A confidential client does not suffer from this problem (a stolen code cannot be exchanged without client authN, and when done through the BFF, the RT is not exposed). 
> 
> And as you state, there are other benefits as well.
> 
> Philipp
> 
> —
> Pragmatic Web Security
> Security for developers
> https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/

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