Re: [OAUTH-WG] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-par-08: (with COMMENT)

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Tue, 06 July 2021 21:53 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Jul 2021 15:52:28 -0600
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To: "Rob Wilton (rwilton)" <rwilton@cisco.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-oauth-par@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-oauth-par@ietf.org>, "oauth-chairs@ietf.org" <oauth-chairs@ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@arm.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-par-08: (with COMMENT)
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In this case the only entity that really has to cope with the lifetime is
the same entity that controls the lifetime. The authorization server
creates the request URI and its lifetime and retains the associated data
for the stated time. The URI and expiry information is conveyed to the
client. But the client will just use URI value immediately upon receipt
(which invalidates it) and not care anything about it after that. The
lifetime is largely just some extra information conveyed to the client
that's arguably not even necessary. But sometimes things like that creep in
during standards development. And I am aware of a test harness that is
using the expiration info to test a negative case of checking that an
expired URI value can't be successfully used. So I guess it's useful in
some cases. But anyway, there's really no reason it'd be an especially
large value and the only one that'd have to deal with it if it were is the
same one that sets the value.

On Thu, Jul 1, 2021 at 6:38 AM Rob Wilton (rwilton) <rwilton@cisco.com>
wrote:

> Hi Brian,
>
>
>
> Thanks.
>
>
>
> Regarding caching, yes, I think that you are right that POST requests
> don’t get cached.
>
>
>
> Regarding the lifetime, why wouldn’t you want to specify a limit?  It
> would seem to make it easier for implementations if they know what they
> never have to cope with a value over X.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Rob
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> *Sent:* 30 June 2021 22:12
> *To:* Rob Wilton (rwilton) <rwilton@cisco.com>
> *Cc:* The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>; draft-ietf-oauth-par@ietf.org;
> oauth-chairs@ietf.org; oauth <oauth@ietf.org>; Hannes Tschofenig <
> hannes.tschofenig@arm.com>
> *Subject:* Re: Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-par-08:
> (with COMMENT)
>
>
>
> Thanks for the review Rob. I've endeavored to reply to your comments
> inline below.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 29, 2021 at 2:54 AM Robert Wilton via Datatracker <
> noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>
> Robert Wilton has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-oauth-par-08: No Objection
>
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-par/
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Hi,
>
> Thanks for this document.  Outside my area of expertise, but I have a
> couple of
> questions/comments:
>
> Section 2:
>    Due to historical reasons there is potential ambiguity regarding the
>    appropriate audience value to use when employing JWT client assertion
>    based authentication (defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC7523] with
>    "private_key_jwt" or "client_secret_jwt" authentication method names
>    per Section 9 of [OIDC]).  To address that ambiguity the issuer
>    identifier URL of the authorization server according to [RFC8414]
>    SHOULD be used as the value of the audience.  In order to facilitate
>    interoperability the authorization server MUST accept its issuer
>    identifier, token endpoint URL, or pushed authorization request
>    endpoint URL as values that identify it as an intended audience.
>
> I may be misunderstanding this text, but I note that by giving flexibility
> to
> the client (i.e., the SHOULD) and being strict on the receiver (MUST
> support x,
> y, z), this seems to encourage a proliferation.  Hence, I was wondering
> whether
> this might be better the other way round.  I.e., be strict with what is
> sent,
> and less strict with what is received: MUST send 'issuer identifier', MUST
> receive 'issuer identifier', SHOULD receive 'token endpoint URL' and
> 'pushed
> authorization request endpoint URL'?
>
>
>
> While definitely not trying to encourage proliferation, the text is aiming
> to help interoperability while also accounting for the treatment in other
> documents (RFC7523/21) and existing implementations while also allowing for
> consistent processing to be implemented across the different endpoints
> where JWT client assertion based authentication can be employed. It's kinda
> tricky and I don't know for sure that the current text is exactly right but
> it's made it through the WG process and seen a number of implementations.
>
>
>
>
>
> 2.
>    *  "expires_in" : A JSON number that represents the lifetime of the
>       request URI in seconds as a positive integer.  The request URI
>       lifetime is at the discretion of the authorization server but will
>       typically be relatively short (e.g., between 5 and 600 seconds).
>
> JSON numbers are doubles, but the value is a positive integer.  Does it
> make
> sense to put in a hard limit of 2^53, or given that these are expected to
> be
> small numbers, 2^31 - 1?
>
>
>
>  I think the soft general guidance is enough and don't believe a hard
> upper limit is needed.
>
>
>
>
>
> 3. The success and error examples both define:
>     Content-Type: application/json
>     Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store
>
> The document states that the response should be JSON, but should it more
> specifically specify the content type as "application/json"?
>
>
>
> Yeah, it probably should be that specific. I'll add the content type
> specificity to the document.
>
>
>
>
>
> Similarly, the
> cache control makes sense, but should the document mandate that the
> response
> must include "Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store"?
>
>
>
> Although it makes sense not to cache I'm less comfortable mandating cache
> control stuff - particularly for a response to a POST (that I'm not sure is
> ever cacheable anyway) and for a client that is most likely not doing any
> caching at all and would immediately encounter failures if it were.
>
>
>
>
>
> Regards,
> Rob
>
>
>
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