Re: [OAUTH-WG] Notes on draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-01
"Richer, Justin P." <jricher@mitre.org> Tue, 02 December 2014 18:53 UTC
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From: "Richer, Justin P." <jricher@mitre.org>
To: Thomas Broyer <t.broyer@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: Notes on draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-01
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Date: Tue, 02 Dec 2014 18:53:25 +0000
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Notes on draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-01
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Thomas, thanks for the review. Responses inline. On Dec 2, 2014, at 11:08 AM, Thomas Broyer <t.broyer@gmail.com<mailto:t.broyer@gmail.com>> wrote: Hi, Here are some notes about draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-01. Background: I have implemented and deployed -00 (actually that was some version of the individual draft, before it got adopted by the WG), currently with only a couple "clients" (out of 20 or so OAuth 2.0 clients currently, only a couple expose resources themselves and thus need the introspection endpoint; we otherwise have many resources exposed by the same piece of software as the AS so they use internal means of validating the token without the need for the introspection endpoint). resource_id OPTIONAL. A service-specific string identifying the resource that the token is being used for. This value allows the protected resource to convey to the authorization server the context in which the token is being used at the protected resource, allowing the authorization server to tailor its response accordingly if desired. I think it should be noted somewhere that it's totally OK for the introspection endpoint to tailor the response to the resource server making the request too, independently of whether there's a resource_id or not. With "tailoring the response" meaning that it could return active:false even if the token is active but the AS doesn't want the RS to know about it (because, for example, it knows that the token doesn't grant any scope that the RS accepts, and therefore couldn't be used at the RS), or limiting the returned list of scopes to the ones the AS knows the RS handles. This is very true, we should call that out explicitly in the description of the response. Thanks! As far as resource_id is concerned, I really think an example would make things clearer (what kind of value could be used in a real scenario, etc. – there's been a mail earlier today assuming it would be a URL, which I assume to mean the URL of the resource that received the token and needs to introspect it to allow access or not; my interpretation of the draft initially was that it would rather be identifiers as can be seen for scopes, or a resource-set ID <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardjono-oauth-resource-reg-03> ) My thought on this was that it would be the URL in many cases, but I want to keep it as a generic string to allow for resource sets or other identifying mechanisms. This is going to have to be something that's agreed on between the AS and RS if it's going to mean anything. I agree on adding it to at least one of the examples. The methods of managing and validating these authentication credentials are out of scope of this specification, though it is RECOMMENDED that these credentials be distinct from those used at an authorization server's token endpoint. and later in the Security Considerations section: The authorization server SHOULD issue credentials to any protected resources that need to access the introspection endpoint, SHOULD require protected resources to be specifically authorized to call the introspection endpoint, and SHOULD NOT allow a single piece of software acting as both a client and a protected resource to re- use the same credentials between the token endpoint and the introspection endpoint. Could you expand on the RECOMMENDED and SHOULD NOT here? What would be the problem with using the same credentials? What's the trade-off? Different credentials for different purposes, and it lets you manage things separately at the server. In other words, you've got one class of thing that *gets* tokens, and one class of thing that *accepts* tokens. The dynamic resource registration draft doesn't presume client credentials at all, since a resource might not (and in many cases is not) also an OAuth client. This draft even uses tokens to authorize its calls to the introspection endpoint, which was suggested as MTI in another thread. Additionally, and this may be getting unnecessarily colored by our own implementation and deployment of pre-WG drafts: we have it currently implemented such that both are clients (and Ping does something similar with their own method of accomplishing the same thing), and we want to start to keep these classes separate. We've found that developers get confused about whether they're a client or a resource or whatnot as it is. This recommendation helps keep the roles separate logically, though servers are of course free to throw everyone in the same bucket if they so choose. The response MAY be cached by the protected resource, and the authorization server SHOULD communicate appropriate cache controls using applicable HTTP headers. Reading through https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7234 (and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231) it's not clear to me how cache headers would really help, given that the requests to the introspection endpoint are mostly using the POST method ("optionally" a GET method, and the Security Considerations section somehow discourages it). You'd want to check with the HTTPWG but maybe this text should define what the cache-key would be (it would at least include the token and resource_id if provided, maybe also the token_type_hint), and that the response SHOULD NOT have Cache-Control:public or even s-maxage (for the same reason that it should be protected by authentication). I'd actually rather say that the RS may cache the response (we're talking about an "application-level cache" here, not an HTTP cache), and probably should do it for a small amount of time; and possibly (not sure how well that would fit here) hint that the AS could very well return an HTTP 429 (Too Many Requests) <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6585> if it somehow detects that the RS doesn't use a (application-level) cache (e.g. asks many times for the same token in a very short time frame). This is the kind of things I could very well add to my implementation later on if we ever see a very high number of requests on our introspection endpoint (because looking up a key-value store using the token as key is much faster than validating the token – our tokens are base64url-encoded JSON structures containing an ID and a salt, and we store the ID and a hash in our datastore; validating a token thus involves decoding base64url, parsing JSON and computing a hash, in addition to looking it up in the datastore and validating "iat" and "exp"). All that we're really trying to say here is that the protected resource is allowed to cache the response if it wants to, and that the AS could give some hints as to how to do it. I can pull out the HTTP-cache-mechanism language if it's just confusing the matter (which I suspect it is). In one deployment profile I've written of this, we say that the RS can cache the introspection result for up to half the token lifetime, given by the 'exp' claim (which we also require in the profile). If the protected resource uses OAuth 2.0 client credentials to authenticate to the introspection endpoint and its credentials are invalid, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) as described in section 5.2<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-01#section-5.2> of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>] Either I don't understand what "OAuth 2.0 client credentials" actually means, or that section should mention HTTP 401 (Unauthorized). (we use HTTP Basic auth FWIW so, per the HTTP spec, we return a 401 for bad credentials). If the protected resource uses an OAuth 2.0 bearer token to authorize its call to the introspection endpoint and the token used for authorization does not contain sufficient privileges or is otherwise invalid for this request, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 400 code as described in section 3<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-01#section-3> of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750>] Same here; unless you use the "Form-Encoded Body Parameter" or "URL Query Parameter" means of sending a Bearer token, the status code would be a 401. BTW, if an introspection endpoint MAY support those means of authenticating a RS, then it should be more clearly stated in the draft that it is allowed and left at the discretion of the implementation. As an implementer, unless I'm told that I could use access_token in the request body, I would assume only the Authorization header is accepted. Noted, I'll change these to 401. Thanks very much! -- Justin
- [OAUTH-WG] Notes on draft-ietf-oauth-introspectio… Thomas Broyer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Notes on draft-ietf-oauth-introspe… Richer, Justin P.
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Notes on draft-ietf-oauth-introspe… Thomas Broyer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Notes on draft-ietf-oauth-introspe… Richer, Justin P.