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Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri

Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> Fri, 10 January 2020 19:31 UTC

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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 19:31:39 +0000
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Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
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Sure, but we know how to run resilient services. My point is that there’s nothing particularly special about cryptographic keys: if you want to control how they are used there is a whole range of normal access control methods you can apply to them without needing to change anything in OAuth. 

Neil

> On 10 Jan 2020, at 18:50, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> There are many other factors to resiliency than multiple instances. 
> 
>> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 10:30 AM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> > On 10 Jan 2020, at 17:22, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
>> [...]
>> > 
>> > As to the suggestion of using a JWT-decryption-microservice, another goal would be increased resiliency of the components. If the JWT-decryption-microservice is unavailable, the whole system is unavailable. If there are separate keys, then a failure in one component does not fail the entire system. 
>> 
>> Well you can run more than one instance - it’s a completely stateless service. You can also run a separate instance (or set of instances) per key if you like. 
>> 
>> Neil

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