Re: [OAUTH-WG] First Draft of OAuth 2.1

[Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]>]

> The Security BCP recommends S256.

Is a recommendation enough to change the default? That's definitely
normative changes from PKCE. I could be convinced either way, but it
would be the first place that 2.1 deviates from the combination of the
RFCs and BCPs.

----
Aaron Parecki
aaronparecki.com
@aaronpk

On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 2:01 PM Torsten Lodderstedt
<[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Am 12.03.2020 um 21:59 schrieb Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]>:
> >
> > 
> >>
> >> In regards to `code_challenge_method` parameter in authorization requests. Wouldn't make more sense to have the default value as `S256` based on the statement in Section `4.1.1.2.  Client Creates the PKCE Code Challenge` that says that `S256` is MTI on the server?
> >> So you have `plain` as a special case for clients not able to support a more strong code challenge?
> >
> > One of the goals of this draft was to consolidate the information
> > available in the related extensions and BCPs, not actually define
> > anything new itself. This behavior described would be different from
> > what is described in PKCE. If this is a good idea to change the
> > default, then that should be included in the Security BCP and brought
> > into 2.1 from there.
>
> The Security BCP recommends S256.
>
> >
> > ----
> > Aaron Parecki
> > aaronparecki.com
> > @aaronpk
> >
> >> On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 12:22 PM Pedro Igor Craveiro e Silva
> >> <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi Aaron,
> >>
> >> In regards to `code_challenge_method` parameter in authorization requests. Wouldn't make more sense to have the default value as `S256` based on the statement in Section `4.1.1.2.  Client Creates the PKCE Code Challenge` that says that `S256` is MTI on the server?
> >>
> >> So you have `plain` as a special case for clients not able to support a more strong code challenge?
> >>
> >> Regards.
> >> Pedro Igor
> >>
> >>> On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 9:29 PM Aaron Parecki <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I'm happy to share that Dick and Torsten and I have published a first
> >>> draft of OAuth 2.1. We've taken the feedback from the discussions on
> >>> the list and incorporated that into the draft.
> >>>
> >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01
> >>>
> >>> A summary of the differences between this draft and OAuth 2.0 can be
> >>> found in section 12, and I've copied them here below.
> >>>
> >>>> This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 (RFC6749),
> >>>> OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC8252), Proof Key for Code Exchange
> >>>> (RFC7636), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
> >>>> (I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps), OAuth Security Best Current
> >>>> Practice (I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics), and Bearer Token Usage
> >>>> (RFC6750).
> >>>>
> >>>>  Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the
> >>>>  original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with
> >>>>  the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed
> >>>>  entirely.
> >>>>
> >>>>  A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below:
> >>>>
> >>>>  *  The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality
> >>>>     from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the only method of using the
> >>>>     authorization code grant according to this specification requires
> >>>>     the addition of the PKCE mechanism
> >>>>
> >>>>  *  Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per
> >>>>     Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >>>>
> >>>>  *  The Implicit grant ("response_type=token") is omitted from this
> >>>>     specification as per Section 2.1.2 of
> >>>>     [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >>>>
> >>>>  *  The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this
> >>>>     specification as per Section 2.4 of
> >>>>     [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >>>>
> >>>>  *  Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query
> >>>>     string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of
> >>>>     [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >>>>
> >>>>  *  Refresh tokens must either be sender-constrained or one-time use
> >>>>     as per Section 4.12.2 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
> >>>
> >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1-01#section-12
> >>>
> >>> I'm excited for the direction this is taking, and it has been a
> >>> pleasure working with Dick and Torsten on this so far. My hope is that
> >>> this first draft can serve as a good starting point for our future
> >>> discussions!
> >>>
> >>> ----
> >>> Aaron Parecki
> >>> aaronparecki.com
> >>> @aaronpk
> >>>
> >>> P.S. This notice was also posted at
> >>> https://aaronparecki.com/2020/03/11/14/oauth-2-1
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
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