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Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0

Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Wed, 24 March 2010 00:55 UTC

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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 17:56:07 -0700
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] First draft of OAuth 2.0
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On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:01 PM, David Recordon <recordond@gmail.com> wrote:
>> §3
>> - Why is the parameter oauth_client_secret required for refreshing access
>> tokens? Use cases 2.2 and 2.3 do not require the client to use (possess) a
>> secret. Does this imply such client are not entitled to refresh tokens? I
>> would suggest to simply remove this parameter.
>
> It shouldn't be required.  Fixed!
> http://github.com/daveman692/OAuth-2.0/commit/a30843724f241f3ea1052c83dcfec0127a11fe00

It was required in WRAP because is lets you recover if a client web
server that holds many refresh tokens is compromised.  You rotate the
client secret, and then the attacker loses access to user data.

Please add it back. =)

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