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[OAUTH-WG] Re: Call for adoption - PIKA

David Waite <david@alkaline-solutions.com> Tue, 17 September 2024 22:27 UTC

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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 16:26:54 -0600
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To: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Call for adoption - PIKA
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> On Sep 17, 2024, at 1:58 PM, Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com> wrote:
> 
> I frankly don't see how the central premise of PIKA - the reliance on a TLS web domain certificate - can be made to work in practice.
> 
> 
> 
> Reasons: Infrastructure in the real world, mixing of concerns, conflict with CA policies and CAB Forum requirements, NIST etc guidance compliance issues.
> 
I agree with Vladimir unfortunately.

A certificate is a bundle of restrictions, but the two most critical are on subject name and purpose. This reuses a certificate meant to secure network traffic with a particular DNS name to one securing arbitrary application messages from a particular origin.

This would not only break a lot of organizational security policies (and potentially conflict with how they deploy their network infrastructure), but ignores CA policy that is baked into the TLS certificate.

-DW

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