Re: [OAUTH-WG] review comments on draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-11.txt

[Phil Hunt <[e-mail]>]

Huh?

There's no need for public clients to access the token endpoint as they can register anonymously.

Phil

@independentid
www.independentid.com
[e-mail]





On 2013-06-06, at 10:47 AM, Justin Richer wrote:

> Because anonymous *registration* and public client *access* to the token endpoint are two different things.
> 
>  -- Justin
> 
> On 06/06/2013 01:43 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>> *why* will the 6749 standard flows (specifically 4.4) not work?
>> 
>> The registration endpoint can allow anonymous access to permit anonymous registration.
>> 
>> This means the configuration endpoints can use normal access tokens obtained through RFC6749 section 4.4 (Client Auth) flows.
>> 
>> Phil
>> 
>> @independentid
>> www.independentid.com
>> [e-mail]
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 2013-06-06, at 10:36 AM, Justin Richer wrote:
>> 
>>> ... because it already *is* a REST protected API. It's protected with the Registration Access Token. Which is an OAuth 2.0 Bearer token. 
>>> 
>>> The *only* difference is how you get the token, which has nothing to do with the REST protected API that it's protecting.
>>> 
>>>  -- Justin
>>> 
>>> On 06/06/2013 01:35 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>> Nobody has explained why using a normal REST protected API won't work. You keep saying that and that you won't go back.  But that doesn't explain the issue.
>>>> 
>>>> Phil
>>>> 
>>>> @independentid
>>>> www.independentid.com
>>>> [e-mail]
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 2013-06-06, at 10:28 AM, Justin Richer wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> I feel we're still just going in circles with these arguments, but my comments are inline:
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 06/06/2013 01:17 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> @independentid
>>>>>> www.independentid.com
>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 2013-06-06, at 9:49 AM, Justin Richer wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Tim, thanks for your review! Comments inline.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 06/05/2013 04:59 PM, Tim Bray wrote:
>>>>>>>> FWIW, I just read the spec through with fresh eyes, and I found the explanation of the workflow in 1.4.2 very useful.  
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> - A developer manually registers and then is able to request “Initial tokens” tokens for a dynamic-app-registration-scope, 
>>>>>>>> - you use that “Initial token” token to register, in exchange you get the client-id & so on, and also a a per-registration “Registration token” for updating that particular registration information
>>>>>>>> - you fetch/update/delete your registration information with that registration token.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The first part, where the developer registers & gets a token for a scope, is vanilla OAuth 2. (right?)  
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Yes, it can be vanilla Oauth2 or it can be the developer (or someone) getting a token through some other means, like browsing to a developer portal and getting a Bearer token. I've edited the example in 1.4.3 in the latest (unpublished) text so that the developer is literally doing OAuth2 to get the initial token. It's important to note that this could be any flavor of OAuth2 token, though Bearer tokens are of course the most common.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The bit about getting an access token specific to that registration is a new flow (right?), but it seems convenient.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Right, it's a new way to get a bearer token so that you can use it at the protected resource. We wanted to re-use the token endpoint for this, but couldn't come up with a reasonable way of doing so (as has been discussed on the list.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> [PH] We still greatly disagree on this.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> *Use the normal token issuing process.*  One reason given was what about anonymous clients?  The answer is, they don't have to do anything. Remember that you have defined TWO endpoints.  The "registration endpoint" and the "configuration endpoint".  A server accepting anonymous registration simply accepts anonymous access at the "registration endpoint".  Clients wanting to update their profiles do the normal client token request flow to the token endpoint to obtain a normal access token useable at the "configuration endpoint".
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> [JR] But then you're opening up the client_credentials flow to anonymous clients, or you've got to be able to lock down client_credentials as a flow to only a special (service-specific) scope for client configuration purposes. This, I think, is much more complicated to implement and much more error prone. I don't think it's even possible in the software stack we're building on top of. And furthermore, you're not letting public clients dynamically register anymore, since you'd be forcing everyone to have a client secret. Your dynamic public clients would have to save the client secret but know to only use it at the registration endpoint, and not the token endpoint where they're used to. This way, it's clear. You get a token that you use at a given endpoint, the end.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> As soon as you do this, other things simplify.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 1.  No need to keep "registration access token" around indefinitely. It's just an access token.  In fact it is only needed for minutes since it will likely only be used to read or update profiles or to perform client initiated credential rotation.
>>>>> 
>>>>> [JR] You *can* throw away your registration access tokens if you want to, or have them expire, if you want to limit the lifespan of your clients. It's only the security considerations section that suggests against expiring the tokens, and for good reason. But it's your choice to change that if you                             don't want longstanding read/edit access to a client's configuration.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 2.  No need to have a special token issuing method. Creating a new issuing process suggests that the WG can't drink its own koolaid.  Because at the first seeming challenge, the WG create a new flow. How do we expect implementers to behave?
>>>>> 
>>>>> [JR] That particular koolaid wasn't the right drink here, to stretch your analogy. Bearer tokens were, which is also the group's koolaid. We tried to go down the road you suggest and it was a dead end. Why do you think it will work better this time? And I'd like to point out a decision from several years ago now to separate the notion of "how you get a token" from "how you use a token" in OAuth2. OAuth1 had all of these rolled in together, and deployment experience showed us that people didn't really want to use it that way. People want components that make sense on their own that let you build systems like this that also make sense.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Forced uniformity isn't necessarily a good thing.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 3.  The registration/configuration API is JUST a normal OAuth2 protected API.
>>>>> 
>>>>> [JR] It already is. Protected resources don't care where you get your tokens from, just that you have them, so from that perspective it is just a protected resource. Our implementation here literally just looks for the token on the way in in the auth layer and makes sure it's got a special service-specific scope that handles registration. 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> If the draft drops "registration access tokens", a lot of the text in the draft disappears.  The whole spec is much simpler.
>>>>> 
>>>>> [JR] Much simpler, perhaps, but much less functional and useful. And honestly, not much of the text actually goes away. Most of the draft isn't about dealing with the registration access token, it's about dealing with the client metadata and the RESTful protocol for managing that. The registration access token is a mechanism for doing so.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   From an OAuth 2 point of view, there's nothing special about how you get or use the Initial token, but giving it a special name makes explaining a plausible workflow easier.  
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Right, and I've admitted that "Initial Access Token" a crappy name, but I haven't heard a better suggestion yet. 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Having said that, I have trouble imagining the scenario where you'd use the 1.4.1 flow, but that may be because of my Google-centric worldview. 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Could be -- but if Google wants to be an open-registration identity provider (like it has been with OpenID 2.0), it will need to handle this flow as well. This is the client acting on its own behalf, showing up and saying "hi, I'm a client!" and that's that. I think this is a very important case for interoperability of dynamic registration.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> And I’m not sure 1.4.3 adds any value at all.  It just seems to be a matter of different ways you could get and make use of the registration access token; and I'm sure there are various interesting combinations that haven't been thought of there.  I'd just lose 1.4.3.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 1.4.3 in -11 is too close to 1.4.2, so what I've done in the current working text is make the initial process of getting the Initial Access Token different (the developer now uses OAuth2 to configure their build environment). The *real* important difference that's being shown here, though, is that the client doesn't call the registration endpoint, the developer (and their build environment) does. So yes, it's exactly all about how you get and use the registration access token. There are plenty of other ways to do it as well, so that's why this section was a non-normative set of examples. To facilitate that understanding, I've moved it to an appendix in the working copy of draft -12.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  -T
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Fri, May 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Donald F Coffin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> See my comments inline [DFC]
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Don
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Donald F. Coffin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Founder/CTO
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> REMI Networks
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 22751 El Prado Suite 6216
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Rancho Santa Margarita, CA  92688-3836
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Phone:      [phone]
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Email:       [e-mail]
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> From: Justin Richer [mailto:[e-mail]] 
>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, May 31, 2013 12:40 PM
>>>>>>>> To: Phil Hunt
>>>>>>>> Cc: Donald F Coffin; [e-mail]
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] review comments on draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-11.txt
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> I feel the need to clarify a couple erroneous things in Phil's statement:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   * To be clear, Draft 11 has the same Registration Access Token system that has been in place since draft 01, it is not inventing something new at the last minute as could be inferred from the statement below.
>>>>>>>> [DFC]  I agree with Justin.  There is nothing new in draft 11 regarding Registration Access Tokens that wasn’t in the initial draft.  It appears because Phil hasn’t been following the proposed drafts until the last call he is now raising an issue no one in the WG saw as an issue.  That’s not to say his point isn’t valid, but the discussion continues to go all over the map between “local” and “federated” tokens, usage of the RFC6749 “Token” endpoint, etc.  It would be great if all of Phil’s points could be addressed in priority
>>>>>>>> without the threads becoming so convoluted no one is able to make sense or even comprehend the point being discussed.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>   * DynReg is using an absolutely standard OAuth 2 Bearer token as the Registration Access Token, it's just not coming from a Token Endpoint. However, since an OAuth Protected Resource doesn't care where its tokens come from so long as it can validate them, I don't see this as a problem -- this is a key point where Phil and I disagree.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> [DFC]  I understand the disagreement, but I have not seen a proposal from Phil that would describe the differences between the two perspectives other than to say that the Dynamic Registration should use the Token endpoint defined in RFC6749, which does not    discuss dynamic registration.  Phil’s point as I understand it is that there should be no difference between an access token used to access resource owner protected data and the registration structure, which I do not agree with.  As I said in the previous
>>>>>>>>             response, my users do NOT want to provide implied access to resource owner protected data just because a client is creating a registration with an AS.  This would be the situation if the client credential flow is used to register an application.  Since our
>>>>>>>>             implementation does NOT support the implicit flow, that use case is one we have elected NOT to support.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>             [DFC]  I repeat my initial comment, this conversation has been a circular exchange now for the past few days without any appearance of an alternative option to resolve the issues.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2013 03:33 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Don,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> I am not proposing any change in meaning. If registration acces token issues by normal token server with scope registration everything is clear as it is for any other protected API. Draft 11 invents a whole new system. I strongly disagree with this.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-31, at 15:16, Donald F Coffin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> For something that was agreed to be parked a few hours ago, there sure seems to still be a lot of circular discussion.  Should we ask a mediator to intervene?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> FWIW I believe that is a significantly strong reason to differentiate an access token that can access the registration information without having the ability to access protected data.  Especially given the implied strength of the “client credential” obtained access token.  I have found it extremely confusing to users when explaining the difference between an access token obtained thorough an authorization code flow and a client credential flow, simply because they are both called an “access token”.  Changing the meaning of an access token obtained through the client credential flow to mean it has the ability to update a registration, when a user may not want it to have access to protected data will only increase both the complexity of the access tokens as well as make their usage harder to explain to non-technical individuals who have to understand the                                                           differences between the access tokens obtained through the various flows.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Just my two cents.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Don
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Donald F. Coffin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Founder/CTO
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> REMI Networks
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 22751 El Prado Suite 6216
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Rancho Santa Margarita, CA  92688-3836
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Phone:      [phone]
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Email:       [e-mail]
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> From: Phil Hunt [mailto:[e-mail]] 
>>>>>>>> Sent: Friday, May 31, 2013 11:11 AM
>>>>>>>> To: Justin Richer
>>>>>>>> Cc: [e-mail] WG
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] review comments on draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-11.txt
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> To be clear. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> It is two separate issues. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> 1. Anonymous clients can easily be handled through policy config. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> 2. Support for implicit clients needs to be discussed. The current proposal creates large negative value for the service provider and most would never allow in current form. Yes it gives each execution instance a new id, but that isnt what sp's want. It is a huge attack and management headache. Eliminate or propose a                                                           different solution. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-31, at 13:58, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I'm not willing to write out an entire class of clients from this spec, especially when we have                                                           stated use cases for them doing dynamic registration.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I'm sorry, but your proposed solution will simply not work.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2013 01:56 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Well the only client that wouldn't have a credential is an implicit client. An implicit client is transient and so would never update. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Besides, as i have stated, implicit clients should not use dyn reg. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-31, at 13:41, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> But the outstanding question is: how do you get the access token to access the created resource (IE: the Registration Access Token)? You can't use the client_credentials flow for a client with no credentials!
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2013 12:58 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Yes. I specified the trivial solution to anonymous clients earlier.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Even simpler. You don't need an access token                                                           to create a new resource. You just need one to access one. That is just basic security config. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-31, at 12:34, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I agree that we are going in circles, since I just was going to bring up my counter argument of "what about clients with no credentials?" again, which *still* isn't addressed by what you suggest doing, below. I also believe that getting rid of the Registration Access Token but using some other token method would actually make the spec larger, though I'd be glad to review a concrete counter-proposal if you'd like to write one. And the fact that OIDC is doing it this way, and considered but rejected the way that you're describing, should say something to the WG here about whether or not this is the right choice. Rough consensus and running code, after all.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Regardless, I agree to park this issue and leave the text as is. We'll move to the next draft in the last call process shortly, as I                                                           have a handful of non-normative editorial changes that I need to make, thanks to feedback from a few folks.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Again, thanks for your thorough                                                           review, Phil, and I look forward to future feedback.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2013 12:28 PM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I disagree. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> There is absolutely no need for a registration access token. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Get rid of it and just use access tokens as per 6749. If you can't                                                           follow 6749 and need new issuing methods, what are others to say regarding                                                           inventing new methods?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> I have not heard                                                           a good reason for the special process or one good enough to warrant a new method for issuing an access token. Does the broader group realize this is what the spec says?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Yes, i heard a lot                                                           saying OIDC does it this way. But that is a political reason, not a technical reason. Still, compatibility is always a strong objective.  Even so, oidc could keep using their                                                           method just fine. There is no obligation here to do the same. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> The only reason so far was expiry                                                           of client creds. Well, why not require the client to update prior to expiry? It makes no sense to have another token with longer expiry. B'sides, even expired the client can re-register from scratch. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Why force the client to persist multiple tokens and creds? That is far far too complex. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Finally if you get rid of registration                                                           access token the spec size will drop roughly in half IMO. This suggests simplicity to me. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> Apologies for my rant. Maybe we should park this for now. We are going in circles. 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-31, at 11:25, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> We *can* keep                                                           it straight just fine, but I just need                                                           you to be                                                           clear about which part you're objecting to because the                                                           answers are                                                           different. Please use the                                                           terms as defined in the                                                           document so                                                           that we all know which                                                           component we're talking                                                           about. I'm sure you'd                                                           agree than in specification                                                           work such as this, precision of language and                                                           labels is key for communication                                                           between                                                           parties. This is precisely why there's a                                                           Terminology section right up front, so                                                           that when I say "Registration                                                           Access Token" you can know                                                           that I mean a                                                           very specific                                                           thing, and                                                           when I say "Initial Registration                                                           Token" I mean                                                           a very different specific                                                           thing. So I'm asking you, please, use                                                           the defined                                                           terms so that we can avoid                                                           this                                                           unnecessary confusion.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> But anyway,                                                           what you're talking about below, "the                                                           token the                                                           client uses to update is                                                           profile" *IS* the                                                           Registration                                                           Access Token. That's all that that token is used                                                           for. You're not asking for it to go away,                                                           you're asking                                                           for it to come                                                           from the Token                                                           Endpoint instead of the                                                           response from the                                                           Registration                                                           Endpoint. I                                                           don't see how                                                           the client *can* get it from the                                                           normal token                                                           process without jumping                                                           through                                                           specialized                                                           hoops to make                                                           that happen. I've                                                           implemented                                                           the draft the                                                           way that it is                                                           right now, both client and server side, and it works. Others have                                                           implemented                                                           it, too. We've                                                           done interop                                                           testing, and                                                           it works. This is a proven                                                           pattern and                                                           from where I sit there is                                                           both rough                                                           consensus and                                                           running code.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I believe that I've already pointed out how the                                                           solutions you've                                                           proposed so                                                           far won't work in practice, for various reasons, many of which have                                                           already been                                                           brought up and                                                           discussed                                                           previously. If you have                                                           another way for the client to get its Registration                                                           Access Token, please propose                                                           it; but I haven't seen                                                           anything yet that will fly.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On                                                              05/31/2013                                                           11:10 AM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Justin,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> This is my primary objection! We can't keep it straight. Their should be no such thing as a registrstion access token! Just the token the client obtains to update its profile through the normal token request process.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-31, at 10:55, Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Which token are you referring to here?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> If it's the Initial Registration Token, then you could get that through the normal token server no problem. (The lifecycle writeups don't call this out explicitly but I would be willing to do so.) Or you could get it elsewhere. Doesn't matter, just like it doesn't matter with any other OAuth2 protected resource.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> If it's the Registration Access Token, then having the token come from the token endpoint would require a lot more work and complexity on behalf of both of the client and server. Either you end up with public clients getting secrets they shouldn't need or with granting clients access to the client_credentials flow when they shouldn't actually have it. Plus it adds extra round trips which don't buy you anything.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2013 10:15 AM, Phil Hunt wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The preference is to have the access token for registration issued by the normal token server rather then by the registration endpoint.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> In the current draft it is obtained through a unique process and must outlive the client.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-30, at 19:47, "Richer, Justin P." <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I don't understand any of the comments below -- it already *is* an OAuth2 protected resource without any special handling. Your access tokens can be short-lived, long-lived, federated, structured, random blobs ... totally doesn't matter. They are access tokens being used to access a normal protected resource. Full stop.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Anything else is out of scope. The lifecycle discussions at the beginning are merely examples of some ways you *could* use it and are non-normative and non-exhaustive.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> You seem to be asking for something that's already in the draft.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> From: Phil Hunt [[e-mail]]
>>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2013 7:31 PM
>>>>>>>> To: Richer, Justin P.
>>>>>>>> Cc: John Bradley; [e-mail] WG
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] review comments on draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-11.txt
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-30, at 16:11, "Richer, Justin P." <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Comments inline, marked by [JR].
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> From: Phil Hunt [[e-mail]]
>>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2013 5:25 PM
>>>>>>>> To: Richer, Justin P.
>>>>>>>> Cc: John Bradley; [e-mail] WG
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] review comments on draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-11.txt
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> See below.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> @independentid
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> www.independentid.com
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> On 2013-05-30, at 2:09 PM, Justin Richer wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> OK, I think see part of the hang up. I have not seen the scenario that you describe, where you trade a 3rd party token for a "local" token. I have seen where access tokens are federated directly at the PR. (Introspection lets you do some good things with that pattern.)
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>