[OAUTH-WG] TLS question from token revocation draft iesg evaluation

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Sun, 02 June 2013 19:53 UTC

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Date: Sun, 02 Jun 2013 20:52:51 +0100
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] TLS question from token revocation draft iesg evaluation
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Hiya,

This draft has a couple of minor changes needed as a result
of IESG review (see [1]) but one question came up that I
wanted to bring back to the WG to see what you think. Any
good answer should be fine btw, this isn't a case of the
insisting on stuff.

The question is whether the WG think that the situation
related to the mandatory-to-implement TLS version has changed
since that was last discussed a couple of years ago. There
have been changes in the implementation status of TLS1.2
since then, mainly driven by the discovery of weaknesses
with some deployment choices for TLS1.0.

So - should we stick with the TLS1.0 as MTI and TLS1.2
as a SHOULD implement or can we now safely bump up to
TLS1.2 as MTI?

And since its been a source of confusion here before,
we're discussing what's mandatory to *implement* not
what's mandatory to *use*.

Thanks,
S.

PS: the other changes are mechanical so don't need to
take up WG time but feel free to comment to the list,
chairs, authors, me, ... whatever.

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-revocation/ballot/