[OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection and nonce

Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com> Tue, 09 February 2021 06:55 UTC

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From: Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2021 22:55:27 -0800
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To: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response@ietf.org
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection and nonce
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Hi WG,

I wonder if there are any particular reasons to not make nonce a mandatory
parameter for the current JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection draft.
Or, at least, force an AS to include the nonce claim in a JWT response when
nonce is presented in the introspection request similar to what happens
with the similar scenario in the OpenID Connect ID Token?

https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#:~:text=If%20present%20in%20the%20Authentication%20Request%2C,value%20sent%20in%20the%20Authentication%20Request.

This will allow to mitigate replay attacks because clients can correlate
the response with the initial request.

Regards,
Andrii