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Re: [OAUTH-WG] issuing new refresh tokens

Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Tue, 13 July 2010 21:59 UTC

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Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 14:59:25 -0700
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott@gmail.com>
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Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] issuing new refresh tokens
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On Tue, Jul 13, 2010 at 2:05 PM, Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott@gmail.com> wrote:
> I'm not storing tokens at all.  And a compromise of the database wouldn't
> expose any tokens or their hashes.  I'm only storing that
> user/client/scope/issued_date tuple -- not the token itself.

And a signing key.  So the question is what happens if both the
signing key and the token database get compromised.

Now that I think of it, you may have issues if the signing key alone
is compromised.  It depends how much other entropy you've added to the
tokens...

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