[OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers

Wayne Chang <wayne@spruceid.com> Tue, 23 July 2024 01:52 UTC

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From: Wayne Chang <wayne@spruceid.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2024 18:51:47 -0700
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: We cannot trust Issuers
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Hi Watson,

Here’s an approach based on TEEs that can in theory create unlinkability
for things like mdocs and SD-JWTs while also conforming to FIPS 140-2/-3.
No new crypto, and PQC-friendly.

https://blog.spruceid.com/provably-forgotten-signatures-adding-privacy-to-digital-identity/

Best,
- Wayne

On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 16:26 Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2024, 3:30 PM John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>
>> I agree that single-use proof keys and batch issuance are a must.
>>
>> Issuer verifier collusion is admittedly a problem.   To address that we
>> do need different cryptographic methods.
>>
>> MDOC also has the same issue.
>>
>> We should document the risk, but short of stopping EUID and mobile
>> driver's license deployment, we have limited options.
>>
>
> The problem only appears when the drivers license or EUID is used in a way
> that makes the user think their data is private. You don't have to support
> UX that lies to the user.
>
>
>> Hopefully, we can make quick progress on JWP.
>>
>> John B.
>>
>> On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 2:14 PM Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Oauth,
>>>
>>> I'm disappointed to see SD-JWT work continue with inadequate privacy
>>> considerations. The fact is an Issuer can link any showings to
>>> issuance of the credential. This is not foregrounded sufficiently in
>>> privacy considerations, nor do we discuss how to ensure users are
>>> aware. We really need to use more RFC 2119 language and highlight
>>> these issues. Section 11.1 about local storage which has never been an
>>> IETF concern before is far more prescriptive than 11.4, and that's not
>>> a good thing. To be clear, the threat model must include an issuer
>>> that is a government issuing credentials that if used to verify age on
>>> certain websites or via a digital wallet on site, and learned about by
>>> the issuer who may have access to data from the site, will result in
>>> imprisonment or execution. This is not a hypothetical scenario.
>>>
>>> Users and UX designers will have intuitions that do not match the
>>> reality and that result in bad decisions being made. That's on us. A
>>> driver's license doesn't leave a trace of where you showed it, but the
>>> SD-JWT does.
>>>
>>> At a minimum I think we mandate batch issuance and one time usage
>>> using RFC 2119 language. We need to say in clear, unambiguous English
>>> that this mechanism enables an issuer to connect every presentation of
>>> a credential to the issuance.
>>>
>>> Sincerely,
>>> Watson Ladd
>>>
>>> --
>>> Astra mortemque praestare gradatim
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list -- oauth@ietf.org
>>> To unsubscribe send an email to oauth-leave@ietf.org
>>>
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