[OAUTH-WG] Language in the security BCP for cases where raw U/P is unavoidable

Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com> Wed, 24 July 2019 15:32 UTC

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From: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.bertocci@auth0.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 08:32:42 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Language in the security BCP for cases where raw U/P is unavoidable
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During Daniel's security BCP presentation yesterday, I commented that
although I support deprecating ROPG, I also believe we should acknowledge
scenarios where U/P use is unavoidable and give clear actionable guidance
to developers.
Daniel observed that not every scenario is prone to be addressed via
OAuth2, and invited me to suggest some language to add to
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-13#section-3.4
clarifying
that.
Here's the proposed language:

Please note: there are scenarios, such as legacy script languages, apps
> using connections strings and similar, where the direct use of username and
> password is required to maintain backward compatibility. Addressing those
> scenarios is outside of the scope of the OAuth2 authorization framework.


As a side note: I worry a bit that giving explicit license to people to
ignore OAuth2 for that particular scenario might provide a bit of slippery
slope/broken window effect where developers won't use standard solutions in
other scenarios as well. At the same time, if we don;t want to tackle that
particular class of scenarios, I think it's fair of us to be explicit about
it.