Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth WRAP

Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Thu, 12 November 2009 16:11 UTC

Return-Path: <beaton@google.com>
X-Original-To: oauth@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 557603A6BF8 for <oauth@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 08:11:40 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -105.977
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-105.977 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id SlFo3I1qXv2j for <oauth@core3.amsl.com>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 08:11:39 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp-out.google.com (smtp-out.google.com [216.239.33.17]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92FB83A6ACC for <oauth@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 08:11:38 -0800 (PST)
Received: from wpaz37.hot.corp.google.com (wpaz37.hot.corp.google.com [172.24.198.101]) by smtp-out.google.com with ESMTP id nACGC6Oa027021 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:12:06 GMT
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=beta; t=1258042326; bh=YtuZDqKYRtrYA7hoQ/jh4LKrweY=; h=MIME-Version:In-Reply-To:References:Date:Message-ID:Subject:From: To:Cc:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding; b=BOSASK01we7Vpy4zXqGKDCC+8IyJUk+Y2CDQuhzXO/hphPNQH6lFsFigTxdqNFt6r XiMteMdn5kY638xVzzRwg==
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; s=beta; d=google.com; c=nofws; q=dns; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to: cc:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:x-system-of-record; b=lhlEXbUs+rOaqBDfkwnLprfrjpp7nyxVUDP2gfSzOTUqXloCapt0Pfdl2SHB9Fm4J y+9UFrF7+ubiXDrQ8qbWg==
Received: from pzk13 (pzk13.prod.google.com [10.243.19.141]) by wpaz37.hot.corp.google.com with ESMTP id nACGC3US022834 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 08:12:03 -0800
Received: by pzk13 with SMTP id 13so1663688pzk.25 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 08:12:03 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.140.136.19 with SMTP id j19mr174706rvd.187.1258042323261; Thu, 12 Nov 2009 08:12:03 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.2.00.0911121041520.23575@perf.cac.washington.edu>
References: <daf5b9570911082102u215dcf22gf0aeb2f3578e5ea0@mail.gmail.com> <35D50F5C-3982-4298-A9E0-86A528F5C5D3@jkemp.net> <daf5b9570911092158k682aff63l959c423c399b2277@mail.gmail.com> <B1B9E4FC-0AF5-4357-B06F-F533C84F3C7D@microsoft.com> <cb5f7a380911101438v2dab3dbas7ab4d40961544833@mail.gmail.com> <4AFB2940.2030709@stpeter.im> <alpine.LFD.2.00.0911121041520.23575@perf.cac.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 08:12:03 -0800
Message-ID: <daf5b9570911120812h529146b9g71a68969dcb31a00@mail.gmail.com>
From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: RL 'Bob' Morgan <rlmorgan@washington.edu>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-System-Of-Record: true
Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth WRAP
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:11:40 -0000

On Wed, Nov 11, 2009 at 6:25 PM, RL 'Bob' Morgan
<rlmorgan@washington.edu> wrote:
> It is my impression that the discussions that led to WRAP were around the
> observation by some large organizations that they find the STS pattern
> attractive to manage access with partners of all kinds; but that the WS-*
> stack is hard to deploy; and OAuth does something much similar and is much
> easier to deploy.  So they'd like a "RESTized STS" or a "OAuth with an STS
> in it".  That's more or less what I see in this proposal, though I haven't
> read it in detail.

Pretty close.  I'd add that the notion of having a highly secured
credential issuing service and less trusted application servers is a
pretty old one.  It's baked into most trusted third-party
authentication protocols, older ones like kerberos, and newer ones
like SAML.

Cheers,
Brian