Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 25 October 2019 22:38 UTC

Return-Path: <kaduk@mit.edu>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3F29120071 for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 25 Oct 2019 15:38:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.199
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hF9uiVquAeNH for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 25 Oct 2019 15:38:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9E3C4120020 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Fri, 25 Oct 2019 15:38:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from kduck.mit.edu ([24.16.140.251]) (authenticated bits=56) (User authenticated as kaduk@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id x9PMc6bE023495 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Fri, 25 Oct 2019 18:38:08 -0400
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2019 15:38:05 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20191025223805.GM69013@kduck.mit.edu>
References: <85D42AA1-FF57-4383-BACB-57C5AA32CFAC@lodderstedt.net> <CAEKOcs2gkM3Henz5nS04_EuBQXWWbJU5K02ErP0rnVZXmjxXJQ@mail.gmail.com> <20191021020546.GZ43312@kduck.mit.edu> <CA+k3eCS7pf3wXBkpbXE0AXKUGogo0YcHd8oWfiBfkPB5axGQQw@mail.gmail.com> <8A8B8892-9D16-4210-BC13-47B5D7859976@mit.edu> <20191024170326.GO69013@kduck.mit.edu> <CAGL6epJZtTXKSGFj0BfhF3kd_Z-z2xzOWXOPEKXc5m18Z4L1uA@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <CAGL6epJZtTXKSGFj0BfhF3kd_Z-z2xzOWXOPEKXc5m18Z4L1uA@mail.gmail.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.12.1 (2019-06-15)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/AragaDOk6rCZ1aasMqDIOBW7_Nk>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-08.txt
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2019 22:38:14 -0000

On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 10:02:41AM -0400, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
> You might want to look at RFC7239, which is trying to address the issue of
> the loss of information by proxies.
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7239
> 
> The document does not have a parameter to carry the client certificate
> information, but it allows for new parameters to be defined.
> 
> Would that help in this case?

That is interesting and related, though the proposed work I remember
hearing about recently is not quite in the same space.  Specifically, it
wanted to have a secure protocol between proxy and backend, and it's not
clear that reusing https for that is the right thing.

-Ben