Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri

Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> Fri, 10 January 2020 18:30 UTC

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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 18:30:04 +0000
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Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [UNVERIFIED SENDER] RE: Cryptographic hygiene and the limits of jwks_uri
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> On 10 Jan 2020, at 17:22, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote:
[...]
> 
> As to the suggestion of using a JWT-decryption-microservice, another goal would be increased resiliency of the components. If the JWT-decryption-microservice is unavailable, the whole system is unavailable. If there are separate keys, then a failure in one component does not fail the entire system. 

Well you can run more than one instance - it’s a completely stateless service. You can also run a separate instance (or set of instances) per key if you like. 

Neil