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[OAUTH-WG] JWT BCP on Compression in JWE

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Fri, 28 July 2017 20:00 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2017 13:59:34 -0600
Message-ID: <CA+k3eCTHfJRWSV1ZGD8-zxPir+-3wqNUtESznxXs5tzJoSU2Zw@mail.gmail.com>
To: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] JWT BCP on Compression in JWE
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On critique of JWT I've seen a few times can be paraphrased as "JWT
supports compressed plaintext so, because of CRIME and BREACH, it is
dangerous and stupid."  It's very possible that I am stupid (many on this
list will likely attest to it) but I don't see the applicability of those
kinds of chosen plaintext attacks aimed at recovering sensitive data to how
JWT/JWE are typically used.

I think it would be useful, if during the development of the JWT BCP, the
authors or chairs or WG could somehow engage some experts (CFRG?) to
understand if there's any real practical advice that can be given about
using compression with JWE and the risks involved.

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