Re: [OAUTH-WG] Native clients & 'confidentiality'

John Kemp <john@jkemp.net> Mon, 19 December 2011 19:35 UTC

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Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Native clients & 'confidentiality'
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Hi Paul,

On Dec 19, 2011, at 12:50 PM, Paul Madsen wrote:

> Hi Mike, to some extent I think my question is not about specific security characteristics, but rather whether its realistic for our group to mandate that both server & native clients have the *same* security characteristics - particularly the ability to 'securely' authenticate to the AS on the token endpoint.

Well… from your description of your case (e.g. "based on a user's subscriptions"), I'm not sure whether the client (software) designation makes much difference. Am I correct in thinking that the credentials which really need to be protected are those assigned to a user, rather than those assigned to a client? In which case, wouldn't it be possible for even a 'public' OAuth client to acquire them from the user dynamically (rather than storing them on the device) and pass them encrypted or hashed to the server?

Cheers,

- John

> 
> thanks
> 
> paul
> 
> On 12/19/11 12:18 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:
>> On 12/19/2011 04:19 AM, Paul Madsen wrote: 
>>> Hi, the Online Media Authorization Protocol (OMAP) is a (as yet unreleased) profile of OAuth 2.0 for online delivery of video content based on a user's subscriptions (the TV Everywhere use case) 
>>> 
>>> We want to support both server & native mobile clients. It is for the second class of clients that I'd appreciate some clarification of 'confidentiality' as defined in OAuth 2. 
>>> 
>>> OAuth 2 distinguishes confidential & public clients based on their ability to secure the credentials they'd use to authenticate to an AS - confidential clients can protect those credentials, public clients can't. 
>>> 
>>> Notwithstanding the above definition, the spec gives a degree of discretion to the AS 
>>> 
>>>    The client type designation is based on the authorization server's 
>>>    definition of secure authentication and its acceptable exposure 
>>>    levels of client credentials. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Give this discretion, is it practical for the OMAP spec to stipulate that 'All Clients (both server & native mobile), MUST be confidential', ie let each individual OMAP AS specify its own requirements of clients and their ability to securely authenticate? 
>> 
>> Hi, 
>> 
>> Can you say exactly what your security requirements are before trying to determine which 
>> (if either) is the right answer? I've got some concerns in this area that I'm trying to understand 
>> and am not sure if they're related to your concern or not. Part of this is that I really don't 
>> understand what the difference is between a "public" client and a "confidential client" and 
>> rereading the draft isn't helping me. In particular, can a iPhone app with a UIWebView *ever* 
>> be a "confidential" client, and if so how? 
>> 
>> Mike 
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