Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00.txt

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Fri, 11 November 2016 21:54 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 14:54:14 -0700
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To: Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se>
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Cc: Nat Sakimura via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi@lists.openid.net>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00.txt
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>From my point of view, the cleaner solution is using existing fields for
what they are well suited rather than inventing new ones.

On Fri, Nov 11, 2016 at 1:21 PM, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> wrote:

> You are right one could absolutely use the jwks or jwks_uri attribute, but
> from my point of view that would be a workaround.
> I would prefer that x5u, x5c and/or x5t was directly available in the
> client registration request not via jwks. This would be a cleaner solution.
>
> Best Regards
> Samuel
>
> On Fri, 11 Nov 2016 at 19:13, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Wouldn't the existing jwks/jwks_uri client metadata parameters suffice?
>> Perhaps some guidance in this document about that is warranted. But I don't
>> believe anything new is needed for that case.
>>
>> On Nov 11, 2016 9:41 AM, "Samuel Erdtman" <samuel@erdtman.se> wrote:
>>
>> Just a quick comment, see inline
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>> I agree that the client_id is unlikely to be found inside the certificate
>> itself. The client_id is issued by the authorization server for the client
>> to use at that single AS. The certificate is issued by the CA for the
>> client to use on any connection. The AS and CA are not likely to be the
>> same system in most deployments. The client will use the same cert across
>> multiple connections, possibly multiple AS's, but the same isn't true of
>> the client_id.
>>
>> Additionally, I think we want to allow for a binding of a self-signed
>> certificate using dynamic registration, much the way that we already allow
>> binding of a client-generated JWK today.
>>
>> Should this specification then extend the dynamic registration
>> specification (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7591) with the certificate
>> parameter to actually do the registration or is that another document?
>>
>>
>> I do think that more examples and guidance are warranted, though, to help
>> AS developers.
>>
>>  -- Justin
>>
>> On 11/2/2016 5:03 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 30, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> I agree it is written so that the connection to the certificate is
>> implicitly required but I think it would be better if it was explicit
>> written since the lack of a connection would result in a potential security
>> hole.
>>
>>
>> That's fair. I agree it can be made more explicit and that it be good to
>> do so.
>>
>>
>>
>> When it comes to the client_id I think subject common name or maybe
>> subject serial numbers will be the common location, and I think an example
>> would be valuable.
>>
>>
>>
>> In my experience and the way we built support for mutual TLS OAuth client
>> auth the client_id value does not appear in the certificate anywhere. I'm
>> not saying it can't happen but don't think it's particularly common.
>>
>> I can look at adding some examples, if there's some consensus that they'd
>> be useful and this document moves forward.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I´m not saying it is a bad Idea just that I would prefer if it was not a
>> MUST.
>> With very limited addition of code it is just as easy to get the
>> certificate attribute for client id as it is to get it from the HTTP
>> request data (at least in java). I also think that with the requirement to
>> match the incoming certificate in some way one has to read out the
>> certificate that was used to establish the connection to do some kind of
>> matching.
>>
>>
>> Getting data out of the certificate isn't a concern. I just believe that
>> the constancy of having the client id parameter is worth the potential
>> small amount duplicate data in some cases. It's just a -00 draft though and
>> if the WG wants to proceed with this document, we seek further input and
>> work towards some consensus.
>>
>>
>>
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>>
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