Re: [OAUTH-WG] XARA vulnerability Paper and PKCE

Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com> Thu, 18 June 2015 15:25 UTC

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Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 00:25:23 +0900
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From: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
To: Bill Mills <wmills_92105@yahoo.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] XARA vulnerability Paper and PKCE
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Yup. Obviously, PKCE is for Code Flow and do not deal with Implicit flow.
The best bet probably is stop using Implicit flow for passing tokens around
among apps, unless token is capable of being sender confirmed.

Nat

2015-06-18 23:47 GMT+09:00 Bill Mills <wmills_92105@yahoo.com>:

> PKCE solves a subset of this, but not the general case.  It doesn't solve
> the FB example in the paper where the FB token is passed between apps
> locally.
>
> It is a clear win for the OAuth code flow for example though.
>
>
>
>   On Thursday, June 18, 2015 7:31 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>
> Hi OAuthers:
>
> XARA (Cross App Resource Access) paper was gaining interest here in Japan
> today because of the Register article[1].
> I went over the attack description in the full paper [2].
> The paper presents four kinds of vulnerabilities.
>
>    1. Password Stealing (Keychain)
>    2. Container Cracking (BundleID check bug on the part of Apple App
>    Store)
>    3. IPC Interception (a. WebSocket non-authentication, and b. local
>    oauth redirect)
>    4. Scheme Hijacking
>
> Of those, 3.b and 4 are relevant to us, and we kind of knew them all the
> way through.
> These are the target attack that PKCE specifically wants to address, and
> does address, I believe.
>
>
> [1]
> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/17/apple_hosed_boffins_drop_0day_mac_ios_research_blitzkrieg/
> [2] https://sites.google.com/site/xaraflaws/
>
>
>
>
> --
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
> http://nat.sakimura.org/
> @_nat_en
>
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>


-- 
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en