[OAUTH-WG] Re: SD-JWT linkability

Paul Bastian <paul.bastian@posteo.de> Tue, 17 December 2024 19:49 UTC

Return-Path: <paul.bastian@posteo.de>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E233C14F5E6 for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 17 Dec 2024 11:49:38 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.099
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_FONT_FACE_BAD=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_SAFE_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=posteo.de
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tjxTRS6gg46h for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 17 Dec 2024 11:49:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mout02.posteo.de (mout02.posteo.de [185.67.36.66]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E9DD0C14E513 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Tue, 17 Dec 2024 11:49:32 -0800 (PST)
Received: from submission (posteo.de [185.67.36.169]) by mout02.posteo.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB816240103 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Tue, 17 Dec 2024 20:49:30 +0100 (CET)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=posteo.de; s=2017; t=1734464970; bh=T5FDwTJMXx+aFii1vvDOHw32is1Tnd66P6zdgF7Bu04=; h=Content-Type:Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:From:From; b=cP3CNqS83beayP7Er5zc5RY0bxB57/Bpq/Ea8TgJN8aALAOppXgSsrRMLtJM33s1Y 1Cvif/pMa4d9uz3SWjADSFNbSSVZI13GY04aOOxjOVfHEzig/d/zlJeMZd44dVSFsn uvpBxxvmw3V/6BNjIjtAWpT7r88vCkwukxgvPwqekbhykAdKn9+mvHBnwxVKrrnLWD xVR/JbnVHvxOKQFMoQTlPdXCZxr57pSOAwC4fd5NoBcsZWngfci7D0eoq/qSlunzDx fnQyQMmPHSpi8XRGNKjrTYYaYmysIPdiQ8MKmvoDNUoH2dPmbynvyZSFhMCpc7cfr3 LcqugSnyH2nZA==
Received: from customer (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by submission (posteo.de) with ESMTPSA id 4YCS7Z435nz6tyK for <oauth@ietf.org>; Tue, 17 Dec 2024 20:49:30 +0100 (CET)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------BfDxPxPyuvfOshGl4SefFL60"
Message-ID: <e9095438-09a1-4718-a778-c20eeab36599@posteo.de>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 19:49:29 +0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: oauth@ietf.org
References: <CACsn0ckGp4AocD1fQbMCs45P_Z5vjveggzDJw=-Vk5kxinM28Q@mail.gmail.com> <CAK2Cwb7OSHHh8DrO3FsBa7szJRpu+v-Zau4bonfPiXbVwNo5NA@mail.gmail.com> <CH3PR13MB6747273907B34CB4D0C83BD1E13B2@CH3PR13MB6747.namprd13.prod.outlook.com> <CAK2Cwb56=VXP4fawyFmKnVHmg6hvAn0PDo3dCTxAvaoWvA0dqg@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0ckeZS7hDDbXgdHtSqmFgohxYW4Ee6UysX-mOMJvyviMCg@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Language: en-US
From: Paul Bastian <paul.bastian@posteo.de>
In-Reply-To: <CACsn0ckeZS7hDDbXgdHtSqmFgohxYW4Ee6UysX-mOMJvyviMCg@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID-Hash: 34OQGYSTIFEZNNEFGHVZ7OBGVGTMYK3N
X-Message-ID-Hash: 34OQGYSTIFEZNNEFGHVZ7OBGVGTMYK3N
X-MailFrom: paul.bastian@posteo.de
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-oauth.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: SD-JWT linkability
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/CVov2-otz1WGu_axs1CRBtZCHFg>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:oauth-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:oauth-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:oauth-leave@ietf.org>

That's because it isn't. SD-JWT has no direct dependency or relation to 
any OpenID spec.

On 17.12.24 02:37, Watson Ladd wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 16, 2024, 5:26 PM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> 
> wrote:
>
>     I could have been more clear. If a verifier is asking for
>     information, it must include strong human-centric ID of verifier,
>     data retention and purpose.  That is not currently possible with
>     the VP. This makes the OID4VP an unethical means to request
>     information. See the following:
>
>
> I didn't understand the draft to be limited to OID4VP. Any sort of 
> presentation would have the same issues.
>
>
>     https://www.acm.org/code-of-ethics
>     Only the minimum amount of personal information necessary should
>     be collected in a system. The retention and disposal periods for
>     that information should be clearly defined, enforced, and
>     communicated to data subjects. Personal information gathered for a
>     specific purpose should not be used for other purposes without the
>     person's consent.
>
>     Clearly information holders can do what they want with their own data.
>
>     Peace ..tom jones
>
>
>     On Mon, Dec 16, 2024 at 11:22 AM Pierce Gorman
>     <Pierce.Gorman@numeracle.com> wrote:
>
>         I think I disagree.  I assume an SD-JWT in a VP could be
>         volunteered by a Holder initiating a transaction.  i.e., the
>         relying party Verifier didn’t request the VP.
>
>         The example I would give is an enterprise making a phone call
>         and using SIP INVITE method Identity header to carry an SD-JWT VP.
>
>         In the US, the TRACED Act law and several FCC mandates require
>         voice calls in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to
>         be authenticated using information contained in a JWT.
>
>         The basic type of JWT required is defined in RFC 8225
>         “PASSporT: Personal Assertion Token” and is carried in the SIP
>         INVITE method Identity header.
>
>         There is also an I-D in the IETF STIR working group which
>         proposes use of an SD-JWT: Verified STI Persona (aka VESPER).
>
>         I assume the VP could be encoded by value in the SIP Identity
>         JWT or could be passed via a DID document reference (in theory).
>
>         Pierce
>
>
>         CONFIDENTIAL
>
>         *From:*Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>         *Sent:* Monday, December 16, 2024 12:50 PM
>         *To:* Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>         *Cc:* IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
>         *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Re: SD-JWT linkability
>
>
>         	
>
>         You don't often get email from thomasclinganjones@gmail.com.
>         Learn why this is important
>         <https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>
>         	
>
>
>         	
>
>         *EXTERNAL EMAIL*
>
>         The entire premise of SD-JWT in a VP transaction is basically
>         fraudulent as there is not sufficient information in the VP to
>         allow the user to make an informed consent decision. It gives
>         the illusion of user control without the ability to deliver on
>         the promise. For this proposal to have any value to the user
>         it must be part of a transaction that tells the user agent
>         (wallet) who is asking for the data and what the purpose of
>         the request is. Absent that, this give the impression of user
>         control of release of data without the fact.
>
>         BTW - the idea of dealing with the UX of the transaction is
>         admirable, but there are no UX people involved in the discussion.
>
>         Peace ..tom jones
>
>         On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 5:01 PM Watson Ladd
>         <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>             Dear all,
>
>             I'd like to propose the following edit to resolve the
>             concerns I have
>             around endorsing dangerous applications of SD-JWT:
>
>             Delete last two lines of
>             https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt/pull/451/files
>             in 1338 and 1339
>
>             Add new paragraph right before the end of the section.
>
>             "When disclosures include information easily understood to be
>             identifying, users intuitive view of what they are
>             revealing largely
>             matches the underlying technical reality. In cases where the
>             information being disclosed is not identifying, SD-JWT
>             MUST NOT be used as this confusion leads to users making
>             the wrong
>             choices. Applications cannot assume Verifiers behave
>             properly (RFC
>             3514) and MUST analyze the consequences for such linkage
>             with each
>             credential that could be used."
>
>             I think this agrees with many of the comments made about
>             my initially
>             stronger edit, while addressing the core danger.
>
>             Also, it seems this section only really treats
>             issuer/verifier despite
>             promising more. Do we need to rework it?
>
>             Sincerely,
>             Watson Ladd
>             -- 
>             Astra mortemque praestare gradatim
>
>             _______________________________________________
>             OAuth mailing list -- oauth@ietf.org
>             To unsubscribe send an email to oauth-leave@ietf.org
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list --oauth@ietf.org
> To unsubscribe send an email tooauth-leave@ietf.org