Re: [OAUTH-WG] Public client cloning

Marius Scurtescu <marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com> Tue, 10 September 2019 17:23 UTC

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From: Marius Scurtescu <marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 10:22:52 -0700
Message-ID: <CABpvcNufpaTRk3BnjJs26b5d9k_8+hd5ZEdFjsmtViTokJiXVg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Masakazu OHTSUKA <o.masakazu@gmail.com>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Public client cloning
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If the phone is compromised, original app replaced by malicious app, then
RFC8252 will not help. The assumption is that the phone is not compromised.

On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 9:58 AM Masakazu OHTSUKA <o.masakazu@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I've read rfc8252 and have questions about native apps, that I couldn't
> find answers on Internet.
>
> Imagine an attacker doing:
> 1. original app and authorization server conforms to rfc8252 4.1.
> Authorization Flow for Native Apps Using the Browser
> 2. clone the original app, name it malicious app and install on the target
> phone
> 3. remove the original app from the target phone
> 4. use the malicious app and authorize, OS will invoke malicious app using
> custom URL scheme
> 5. now malicious app has access to the access token
>
> How should we think about this?
> What am I missing?
>
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