Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD Review of draft-ietf-oauth-spop-10

John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> Sat, 16 May 2015 23:12 UTC

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Sat, 16 May 2015 20:12:24 -0300
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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD Review of draft-ietf-oauth-spop-10
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Hi Kathleen,

I have made the two edits and updated the draft.

John B.

> On Apr 18, 2015, at 12:39 PM, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> I just reviewed draft-ietf-oauth-spop-10 and am thinking more should be said about TLS 1.2 in the security recommendations.  I see that it is recommended through RFC6819 that just says: 
> 
>  Attacks can be mitigated by using transport-layer mechanisms such as
>    TLS [RFC5246].  A virtual private network (VPN), e.g., based on IPsec
>    VPNs [RFC4301], may be considered as well.
> 
> 
> And more has been said in recent publications.  Since this particular draft is addressing a threat exposed when TLS is not in use, the language from the last draft would be better, requiring at least TLS 1.2 and referring to the TLS BCP.
> 
> The only other point from my review is a nit:
> At the end of section 4.4, there should be quotes around both instances of "plain".
> 
> Once this has been addressed, we can start IETF last call.
> 
> Thank you!
> -- 
> 
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
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