Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto
Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Fri, 04 December 2009 18:38 UTC
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Date: Fri, 04 Dec 2009 10:37:46 -0800
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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Cc: "OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto
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I think OAuth 1.0 got this right. Just specify the signature algorithm. That can cover HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, ECC, RSA-SHA1, RSA-SHA256, and whatever other fancy magic someone comes up with next year. Cheers, Brian On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:28 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote: > It’s not really. > > > > We are talking about: > > > > 1. HMAC-specific: > > > > The server sends: > > > > methods=”HMAC:sha-1,sha-256” > > > > The client replies: > > > > method=”HMAC:sha-256” > > > > 2. MAC-generic: > > > > The server sends: > > > > methods=”MAC:hmac-sha1,hmac-sha256” > > > > The client replies: > > > > method=”MAC:hmac-sha256” > > > > Pick! > > > > EHL > > > > From: Breno [mailto:breno.demedeiros@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, December 04, 2009 10:23 AM > > To: Eran Hammer-Lahav > Cc: Manger, James H; Stephen Farrell; OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org) > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto > > > > There is no reason to make HMAC + hash a separate thing. > > > > It would make sense to define a way to specify a MAC, and to specify HMAC > with SHA-1 you need only say HMAC-SHA1 as the algorithm name. > > > > This is pretty conventional. > > On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> > wrote: > > I was not suggesting to explicitly mention them, just allow them. > > > > Currently, I am proposing a HMAC option with the hash algorithm as a > parameter. This would mean changing it to a MAC option with the MAC type and > hash algorithm as parameters. > > > > It adds a bit more complexity but nothing significant. However, if there are > no compelling reasons to do so (no actual use cases or requirements), I am > more inclined to stick with HMAC and allow others to extend it by adding a > new CMAC (etc.) method. > > > > EHL > > > > From: Breno [mailto:breno.demedeiros@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, December 04, 2009 10:17 AM > To: Eran Hammer-Lahav > Cc: Manger, James H; Stephen Farrell; OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org) > > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto > > > > While there are technical merits, both from security and performance > standpoints, to the alternative MAC proposals, there is not extensive > library support for those, and AFAIK they have little usage in the Internet. > I am not sure if it makes sense for OAuth to be on the leading edge in terms > of MAC algorithm adoption. > > On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> > wrote: > > Is there actual demand to make the HMAC method more generic to allow other > kinds of MAC? > > EHL > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Manger, James H [mailto:James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com] >> Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2009 7:43 PM >> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav; Stephen Farrell >> Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org) > >> Subject: RE: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto >> >> >> Sounds reasonable if all you need to negotiate are hash algorithm >> >> names. >> >> Is that the case? >> >> > Yes. >> >> Not quite. >> OAuth (at least the authentication part) mainly needs a MAC algorithm, not >> a >> hash algorithm. >> HMAC is one popular MAC algorithm that is build from a hash algorithm. >> However, there are other MAC algorithms — based on block ciphers for >> instance (eg CMAC-AES). >> The hash registry http://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text- >> names/ is not really going to help. >> >> P.S. The body-signing OAuth extension is the one place that uses a hash >> (not >> a MAC) directly. >> >> James Manger > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > -- > Breno de Medeiros > > > -- > Breno de Medeiros > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > >
- [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Stephen Farrell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Infinity Linden (Meadhbh Hamrick)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Hubert Le Van Gong
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Vrancken Bart bv
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Stephen Farrell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Stephen Farrell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Infinity Linden (Meadhbh Hamrick)
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto John Kemp
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Brian Eaton
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Ben Laurie
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Manger, James H
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Brian Eaton
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Stephen Farrell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Brian Eaton
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Paul C. Bryan
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto stephen.farrell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Eran Hammer-Lahav
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Richard Barnes
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Breno
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Signature crypto Richard L. Barnes