[OAUTH-WG] RFC 7009: Revoke Access Tokens issued to HTML5 web apps

<Thomas.Kupka@bmw.de> Fri, 19 February 2016 11:15 UTC

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From: <Thomas.Kupka@bmw.de>
To: <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: RFC 7009: Revoke Access Tokens issued to HTML5 web apps
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Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 11:14:54 +0000
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] RFC 7009: Revoke Access Tokens issued to HTML5 web apps
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Hi,

we use the OAuth 2.0 Implicit grant to issue access_tokens to client applications such as HTML 5 web apps that have no secure means to securely authenticating themselves. Even if the credentials would be obfuscated, any user could extract them from the HTTP requests their User Agent makes with minimal effort. Since RFC 7009 also talks about the usage of CORS to support User-Agent clients, however, I believe that these clients should be supported.

So I am having trouble supporting the revocation requirement in RFC 7009 which states:



   The client also includes its authentication credentials as described

   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749]<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.3>;.

Looking at said section in in RFC 6749, it states:


   If the client type is confidential, the client and authorization

   server establish a client authentication method suitable for the

   security requirements of the authorization server.  The authorization

   server MAY accept any form of client authentication meeting its

   security requirements.

I am unsure whether "having no form of client authentication" conforms to the standard, can you comment on this?

As a side note, I wonder why client authentication for token revocations is required anyway, because if a client received a token by any legit means, it should always be able to revoke it, regardless of authentication. And if an unauthorized client 'stole' any type of token, revoking it should also be possible, since loss of service for the intended client should always be preferred over misusing the token.

Cheers,

Thomas


BMW Group
Thomas Kupka
Customer Data Management, FG-6301
GCDM Identity & Access Management
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Mail: Thomas.Kupka@bmw.de<mailto:Thomas.Kupka@bmw.de>
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