[OAUTH-WG] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-26: (with COMMENT)
Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 11 August 2020 15:52 UTC
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Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 08:52:55 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-26: (with COMMENT)
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Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-26: No Objection When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks for the many updates as we worked through the issues. Let's also add a note about "whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0 authorization request parameters" to the definition of Request Object in Section 2.1 (in addition to the note in the Introduction); my apologies for not including that when I suggested the change to the Introduction. Please update the Content-Length in the example in Section 5.2.3. Section 4 The client determines the algorithms used to sign and encrypt request objects. This decision can be based on metadata the client registered via dynamic client registration [RFC7591] using the parameters "request_object_signing_alg", "request_object_encryption_alg", "request_object_encryption_enc" as defined in the the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591]. I had to read this ("this decision can be based on [...]") a few times to understand it. If I understand correctly, the idea is that the client will register with the AS the keys it will use for constructing the JAR, and in that way the AS has a binding from JAR-signing key to the specific client and request. So it's true that the decision of what key to use "can be based on" the metadata that the client registered, in that deciding to use a different key than the registered one(s) is likely to cause the AS to reject the request, but that's perhaps not the main point. Would it work to instead just say that "The keys used to sign and encrypt request objects (and thus, the algorithms that can be used with those keys) can be registered via dynamic client registration [...]"? Section 5.2 The contents of the resource referenced by the URI MUST be a Request Object, unless the URI was provided to the client by the Authorization Server. The "request_uri" value MUST be either URN as defined in RFC8141 [RFC8141] or "https" URI, as defined in 2.7.2 of RFC7230 [RFC7230] . The "request_uri" value MUST be reachable by the Authorization Server. I defer to my ART-area colleagues, but I'm not sure what it means for a URN URI to be "reachable"; is this requirement intended to only apply to the "https:" case? Section 5.2.1 It is possible for the Request Object to include values that are to be revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the "request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. For Is there a good reference for what the lifetime of such a request might be? Perhaps I've been reading too much of GNAP, but my intuition is that much of the time these requests will be single-use, and I don't have as clear of a picture for when they might persist longer. There are also potential security considerations for long-lived request objects, in terms of making sure that there is a binding between the client's intent to use a given request object for a given request, the user's authorization, etc. Section 5.2.3 (side note) I'd consider updating the timestamps in the example response (and perhaps moving to Apache 2.4+ as well?). Section 6.x (nit) I suggest consistency in subsection headings, so, e.g., "JWE Encrypted Request Object" and "JWS Signed Request Object". Section 6.2 The Authorization Server MUST perform the signature validation of the JSON Web Signature [RFC7515] signed request object. For this, the "alg" Header Parameter in its JOSE Header MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm. The signature MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that "client_id" and algorithm. This text suggests that pre-registration is mandatory, whereas up in Section 4 the client's choice of algorithm was merely something that "can be based on [metadata registered via dynamic registration]". I know that dynamic registration is not the only kind of registration possible, but we may want to wordsmith one (or both) location to improve the consistency. Section 6.3 I'd suggest reiterating here the requirement to verify "client_id" consistency between Request Object and request parameters. Section 10 I'd consider reiterating the security importance (i.e., what breaks if you don't apply the check) of a few key compliance requirements and which entity is responsible for enforcing them: - the "request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in request objects, from Section 4 - The request object has the mime-type "application/oauth.authz.req+jwt", also from Section 4 - The client_id in the request object has to match the client_id from the request query parameters, from Section 5 - The AS must only use parameters from the request object, even if the client has duplicated them in the query parameters, also from Section 5 Section 10.2 (e) When a third party, such as a Trust Framework Provider(TFP), provides an endpoint that provides a Request Object URI in exchange for a Request Object. The same requirements as (b) and (c) above apply. In addition, the Authorization Server MUST The (b) case is "the symmetric key for JWE encryption"; do we mean "(c) and (d)" here? Section 10.3 I'm not sure whether the key point of this section is "the following endpoints are RECOMMENDED [...] to use this practice" or "an extension specification should be created as a measure to address the risk". That is, can a deployment unilaterally apply the message-position and intended-interaction-endpoint protections now, or is there need for additional specification work first? Section 10.4 I'm not sure how much of this is distinct from the Request URI Rewrite discussed in Section 10.4.2, but having the request object contents be in a separately dereferenceable URI introduces risk of the dereferenced Request Object being dissociated from the triggering request. (This could happen due to internal error on the client or service hosting the requested URI or content skew over time, in addition to a request URI rewrite.) Having an externally provided single-use nonce in the reqest object would provide a mitigation, but it also (if I understand correctly) not compatible with all of the envisioned use cases for JAR. Section 10.5 Should the rejection of "alg":"none" be limited to the require_signed_request_object case, or universally applied? Section 12.1 (2) (Translation Process) The client uses the client credential that it got to push the request object to the TFP to get the "request_uri". If I understand correctly, the TFP also verifies that the request object is consistent with the claims the client is eligible for based on the certification step in (1). Section 12.2.2 Therefore, per-user Request Object URI should be avoided. If I understand correctly, the only possible alternative is to have per-request URIs (right?), as coalescing multiple user's requests into a single request object URI seems to pose several difficulties. We could perhaps make the recommended alternative more clear.
- [OAUTH-WG] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft… Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on d… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on d… Benjamin Kaduk