[OAUTH-WG] Re: Alternative text for sd-jwt privacy considerations.

Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> Tue, 24 December 2024 18:34 UTC

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From: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2024 10:34:27 -0800
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To: Wayne Chang <wayne@spruceid.com>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Alternative text for sd-jwt privacy considerations.
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There is always the potential to come up with a cred that will be accepted
as enabling access to some resource.
There are some proof mechanisms that state that the bearer has a cred that
enables access.
What we have not achieved is a mechanism that ties the cred to the holder
without an ID number binding to the holder.
That would be a good thing - but the only way I know involves trusting the
telco - which we all know is a dead end.
What other mechanism can bind the holder to the device w/o the telco (or do
we just nationalize the telcos again.)

Peace ..tom jones


On Tue, Dec 24, 2024 at 10:29 AM Wayne Chang <wayne@spruceid.com> wrote:

> No, I don’t mean an ID number. More so attributes of an entity attested by
> a non-governmental entity, and it could use privacy enhancing cryptography
> in this steelman.
>
> Best,
> Wayne Chang
> Founder & CEO | SpruceID <https://spruceid.com/> | LinkedIn
> <https://www.linkedin.com/in/waynebuilds/>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 25, 2024 at 02:17 Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> if by ID you mean ID number - then it is a tracking number.
>> Isn't it super obvious - why are we pretending to be privacy enabling?
>>
>> Peace ..tom jones
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 24, 2024 at 10:15 AM Wayne Chang <wayne@spruceid.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Tom, how do you feel about private sector issued ID?
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Wayne Chang
>>> Founder & CEO | SpruceID <https://spruceid.com/> | LinkedIn
>>> <https://www.linkedin.com/in/waynebuilds/>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 25, 2024 at 02:04 Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> While Waton's statement is correct - it does not address the core
>>>> problem with any credential that comes with an ID.
>>>>
>>>> All reusable IDs enable tracking.  Full Stop.
>>>> All government issued ID enable tracking. Just like social insurance
>>>> number or any other cred.
>>>> So - if you want privacy - don't release the ID number.
>>>>
>>>> Peace ..tom jones
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 24, 2024 at 6:34 AM Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I see that people are uncomfortable with making any mandates, and so
>>>>> I've tried to be purely descriptive in this proposal. I leave it to the WG
>>>>> to decide where to put it, but I see it as a wholesale replacement for some
>>>>> sections to emphasize clarity.
>>>>>
>>>>>  "SD-JWT conceals only the values that aren't revealed. It does not
>>>>> meet standard security notations for anonymous credentials. In particular
>>>>> Verifiers and Issuers can know when they have seen the same credential no
>>>>> matter what fields have been opened, even none of them. This behavior may
>>>>> not accord with what users naively expect or are lead to expect from UX
>>>>> interactions and lead to them make choices they would not otherwise make.
>>>>> Workarounds such as issuing multiple credentials at once and using them
>>>>> only one time can help for keeping Verifiers from linking different
>>>>> showing, but cannot work for Issuers. This issue applies to all selective
>>>>> disclosure based approaches, including mdoc. "
>>>>>
>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>> Watson
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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