Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Feedback on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00

Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de> Wed, 19 May 2021 06:45 UTC

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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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From: Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>
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Date: Wed, 19 May 2021 08:45:27 +0200
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Feedback on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00
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Hi Brian,

thank you for your feedback.

I agree that the language is too strong here. What do you think about 
this new note?

> Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 
> (JARM)" [JARM] defines a mechanism that conveys all authorization 
> response parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an iss claim that 
> provides the same protection if it is validated as described in 
> Section 2.4. Therefore, an additional iss authorization response 
> parameter as defined by this document MUST NOT be used when JARM is used.

Best regards,
Karsten

On 15.05.2021 00:35, Brian Campbell wrote:
> Overall it looks pretty good to me.
> One little nit is that I don't love this text from the end of sec 2.4 
> that talks about JARM:
>
> 'Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 
> (JARM)" [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the 
> authorization response. Therefore, the iss parameter MUST NOT be used 
> when JARM is used. However, JARM responses contain an iss claim that 
> provides the same protection if it is validated as described in 
> Section 2.4.'
>
> JARM doesn't exactly forbid additional parameters but rather just 
> wraps up all the authorization response parameters as claims in a JWT 
> which is itself sent as a single form/query/fragment parameter. So 
> really the iss authorization response parameter of this draft is still 
> sent as a claim of the JARM JWT. It just happens to be the same as the 
> iss claim value that JARM is already including.
>
> On Sat, May 1, 2021 at 2:47 PM Rifaat Shekh-Yusef 
> <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     All,
>
>     We have not seen any comments on this document.
>     Can you please review the document and provide feedback, or
>     indicate that you have reviewed the document and have no concerns.
>
>     Regards,
>      Rifaat & Hannes
>
>
>     On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 3:04 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>     <karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de
>     <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de>> wrote:
>
>         Hi all,
>
>         the latest version of the security BCP references
>         draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 as a countermeasures to
>         mix-up attacks.
>
>         There have not been any concerns with the first WG draft
>         version so far:
>         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>         <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp/>
>
>         I would like to ask the WG if there are any comments on or
>         concerns with the current draft version.
>
>         Otherwise I hope we can move forward with the next steps and
>         hopefully finish the draft before/with the security BCP.
>
>         Best regards,
>         Karsten
>
>         -- 
>         Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>         Senior IT Security Consultant
>         Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
>         Web:	https://hackmanit.de  <https://hackmanit.de>  | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training
>
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-- 
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:	+49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:	https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, Security Training

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