Re: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP - Downgrades, Transitional Rollout & Mixed Token Type Deployments

[Torsten Lodderstedt <[e-mail]>]

> On 7. Jun 2020, at 16:18, Nov Matake <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> private_key_jwt and mTLS can be sender PoP method for code too.

Seems we need to distinguish certain “kinds” of PoP for code. 

1) private_key_jwt, mTLS and other client secrets can be used to authenticate the client and thus check the binding of the code to a particular client_id.

2) PKCE is different in that it allows to tie the code to a certain transaction running on a certain device. 

(2) detects code replay at the same client_id on a different device, (1) does not. 

Regarding PoP for access tokens: private_key_jwt does not provide this capability. mTLS and DPoP provide it for both confidential and public clients. 

> 
>> 2020/06/07 23:00、Francis Pouatcha <[e-mail]>のメール:
>> 
>> I am a little bit confused. Let me  break it down:
>> 
>> code :
>>   -> sender : Client
>>   -> consumer : AS
>>   -> sender PoP : 
>>        --> confidential client: code_verifier (PKCE)
>>        --> public client:  code_verifier (PKCE)?
>> 
>> refresh_token :
>>   -> sender : Client
>>   -> consumer : AS
>>   -> sender PoP : 
>>        --> confidential client: private_key_jwt, mTLS
>>        --> public client:  DPoP?
>> 
>> access_token :
>>   -> presenter : Client
>>   -> consumer : RS
>>   -> sender PoP : 
>>        --> confidential client: private_key_jwt, mTLS
>>        --> public client:  DPoP?
>>   
>> Is this correct?
>> 
>> On Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 8:42 AM Nov Matake <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> * sender-constrained code, bearer access token and sender-constrained refresh token, use DynReg or "PKCE + DPoP allowing access token remaining bearer".
>> * sender-constrained code, sender-constrained access token and sender-constrained refresh token, use "DynReg + DPoP" or "PKCE + DPoP".
>> * bearer code, sender-constrained access token and sender-constrained refresh token, use DPoP only.
>> * sender-constrained code, bearer access token and bearer refresh token, use PKCE only.
>> * bearer code, bearer access token and bearer refresh token, use none of them.
>> 
>>> 2020/06/07 21:36、Nov Matake <[e-mail]>のメール:
>>> 
>>> Yeah, both PKCE and Client Credential provide sender-constrained code...
>>> lots of choices
>>> 
>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>> 
>>>> On Jun 7, 2020, at 21:26, Neil Madden <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Answers inline: 
>>>> 
>>>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 13:07, Nov Matake <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> So, you mean…
>>>>> 
>>>>> If a frontend client want to use
>>>>> * sender-constrained code, bearer access token and sender-constrained refresh token, use DynReg.
>>>> 
>>>> I’m not really sure what a sender-constrained code would be, but I suspect the right answer here is PKCE + DPoP. PKCE basically is PoP for auth codes. 
>>>> 
>>>>> * sender-constrained code, sender-constrained access token and sender-constrained refresh token, use DynReg + DPoP.
>>>> 
>>>> PKCE + DPoP
>>>> 
>>>>> * bearer code, sender-constrained access token and sender-constrained refresh token, use DPoP only.
>>>> 
>>>> Sure, but you should always use PKCE, so PKCE + DPoP. 
>>>> 
>>>>> * bearer code, bearer access token and bearer refresh token, use neither.
>>>>> 
>>>>> is my understanding correct??
>>>> 
>>>> Just use PKCE + DPoP. (Or a different PoP mechanism, eg mTLS cert-bound tokens, or etc). 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 2020/06/07 20:49、Neil Madden <[e-mail]>のメール:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> There are multiple issues with using dynamic client registration for this. If a user uninstalls and later reinstalls an app then they can end up with multiple registrations for the same client, which makes it harder for them to manage access. Additionally, client registrations typically don’t expire so the AS doesn’t know when it can remove unused clients.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Besides, this ship already sailed with mTLS cert-bound refresh tokens. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Neil
>>>>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Francis Pouatcha
>> Co-Founder and Technical Lead at adorys
>> https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/
> 
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