Re: [OAUTH-WG] Last Call: <draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-09.txt> (JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection) to Proposed Standard

Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> Mon, 31 August 2020 08:33 UTC

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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 09:33:22 +0100
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Cc: "dick.hardt" <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, "last-call@ietf.org" <last-call@ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Last Call: <draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-09.txt> (JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection) to Proposed Standard
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But if you want to handle revocation (and you do), then the alternative is short-lived access tokens with frequent refreshing, which also informs the AS of activity. So is this any better?

If an org running an RS decides to use a 3rd-party AS (eg cloud hosted) then there are privacy implications to that arrangement, regardless of the specific technology used for token validation.

> On 26 Aug 2020, at 22:16, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> I agree with Dick’s observation about the privacy implications of using an Introspection Endpoint.  That’s why it’s preferable to not use one at all and instead directly have the Resource understand the Access Token.  One way of doing this is the JWT Access Token spec.  There are plenty of others.
>  
> The downsides of using an Introspection Endpoint should be described in the Privacy Considerations section.
>  
>                                                        -- Mike
>  
> From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Dick Hardt
> Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2020 9:52 AM
> To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
> Cc: last-call@ietf.org; oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Last Call: <draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response-09.txt> (JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection) to Proposed Standard
>  
>  
>  
> On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 4:37 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten=40lodderstedt.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> Hi Denis,
> 
> > On 25. Aug 2020, at 16:55, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote:
> 
> > The fact that the AS will know exactly when the introspection call has been made and thus be able to make sure which client 
> > has attempted perform an access to that RS and at which instant of time. The use of this call allows an AS to track where and when 
> > its clients have indeed presented an issued access token.
> 
> That is a fact. I don’t think it is an issue per se. Please explain the privacy implications.
>  
> As I see it, the privacy implication is that the AS knows when the client (and potentially the user) is accessing the RS, which is also an indication of when the user is using the client.
>  
> I think including this implication would be important to have in a Privacy Considerations section.
>  
> /Dick
> ᐧ
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