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Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection and nonce

Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> Thu, 18 March 2021 12:25 UTC

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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2021 13:25:00 +0100
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To: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
Cc: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>, draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response@ietf.org, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Response for OAuth Token Introspection and nonce
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💯

Warren Parad

Founder, CTO
Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
Authress <https://authress.io/>.


On Thu, Mar 18, 2021 at 1:07 PM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On 18 Mar 2021, at 11:33, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 18, 2021 at 3:45 AM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 18 Mar 2021, at 05:33, Andrii Deinega <andrii.deinega@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> 
>> The Cache-Control header, even with its strongest directive "no-store",
>> is pretty naive protection... Below is an excerpt from RFC 7234 (Hypertext
>> Transfer Protocol: Caching).
>>
>> This directive is NOT a reliable or sufficient mechanism for ensuring
>>> privacy.  In particular, malicious or compromised caches might not
>>> recognize or obey this directive, and communications networks might be
>>> vulnerable to eavesdropping.
>>
>>
>> This quote is about privacy. Your concerns so far have been about replay
>> protection. TLS protects both.
>>
>>
>> Regarding TLS, I've mentioned that we don't always have the luxury to see
>> what is going on with the infrastructure. A bright example would be an AS
>> implemented as a serverless application and hosted by one of the cloud
>> providers.
>>
>>
>> Right, but (as I’ve said before) the same reasoning applies to a JWT too.
>> The infrastructure could just as easily “terminate JWS” as it currently
>> terminates TLS. As I keep saying, it’s much better to spend your time
>> ensuring end-to-end TLS than end-to-end JWT.
>>
>
> That's not always possible. In some enterprises, they will have an
> inspection middlebox that breaks the end-to-end TLS, e.g., ZScaler.
>
>
> And if you use encrypted JWTs to work around that you’ll soon have
> inspection middleboxes that break end-to-end JWT. This isn’t a game we can
> win by adding more layers of the same solution.
>
> — Neil
>
> ForgeRock values your Privacy <https://www.forgerock.com/your-privacy>
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